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Though negative emotions are inherently painful and aversive, getting rid 
of them is often remarkably difficult. Negative emotions are in many ways 
adaptive, by alerting people to potential threats and obstacles in the environment 
(Öhman, 2007). However, persistent negative emotions can impair psychological 
functioning. For instance, chronically activated negative emotions can interfere 
with cognitive performance (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), impact social behavior 
(Forgas, 1994), or lower self-esteem and result in less optimistic life-expectations 
(Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999). Moreover, chronic stress can 
undermine people’s physical health; increasing the risk on cardiovascular 
disease (Kemp, Malhotra, Franco, Tesar, & Bronson, 2003) and weakening the 
immune system (Kemeny & Schedlowski, 2007).  
No matter how sheltered people might lead their lives, some amount of 
negative emotion is probably unavoidable. Accordingly, it seems important to 
look for ways in which people may protect themselves against the potentially 
disruptive impact of negative emotions. One promising approach in this regard 
consists of minimizing the extent to which people attend to negative information. 
Attention to emotional information occurs very early in the emotion generation 
process (Gross & Thompson, 2007). Hence, by controlling attention to negative 
information, people may inhibit any negative emotional experiences before they 
have taken full swing (Dandeneau, Baldwin, Baccus, Sakellaropoulo, & 
Pruessner, 2007). The idea of attentional control has long been recognized by 
emotion regulation theorists (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Parkinson & Totterdell, 
1999; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). Nevertheless, surprisingly little is 
known about its basic mechanisms. The central aim of the present work is 
therefore to investigate the processes that underlie the regulation of negative 
emotions through attentional control.  
The following paragraphs first review the literature on why negative 
emotions are so pervasive, and suggest that this pervasiveness can at least 
partly be explained by the attentional priority of negative information. Next, it is 
described how negative emotions may be regulated through the control of 
attention to negative information. A working memory model of distraction is 
discussed, which suggests that the processing of negative information may 
depend critically on the availability of working memory resources. The present 
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review concludes by considering some important limitations and implications of a 
working memory model of distraction. 
 
The Pervasiveness of Negative Emotions 
The meaning of the term emotion and related constructs such as mood, 
affect, or stress has been subject to recurrent debates within psychology 
(Russell, 2003). Accordingly, it is useful to be explicit about the way in which 
these terms are used in the present context. The current analysis refers to 
negative emotional states in the broadest sense, encompassing all mental states 
that can have a negative valence, such as discrete emotions, moods and 
feelings. Although in everyday language there exist important differences 
between various types of emotional processes, research indicates that the 
functional differences between them are fuzzy (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996). 
Moreover, specific emotions, moods and feelings all involve changes in core 
affect, i.e., basic states of feeling good or bad, aroused or calm (Russell, 2003). 
As such, the regulation of discrete emotions, moods, and feelings likely involve 
some common principles. These common principles are the focus of the present 
discussion.  
Negative emotional states are a pervasive aspect of psychological 
functioning (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Watkins, 2008) 
and their influence extends to many domains of human life, such as intimate 
relationships, social networks, parenting, and professional performance 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). Moreover, when people 
process information, they tend to give more weight to negative than to positive 
aspects. For instance, people’s mood states are influenced more strongly by 
negative than by positive events (David, Green, Martin, & Suls, 1997), and 
people become more distressed about losing money than they are happy about 
gaining it (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).    
Because of the biological significance of negative emotional stimuli, the 
human brain may be designed in a way that negative information easily captures 
attention (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Öhman, 2007). In line with such an 
automatic vigilance account (Pratto & John, 1991), research has demonstrated 
how processing of negative information can occur quickly and unintentionally 
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(Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003; Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2001; Robinson & 
Compton, 2006; Smith, Cacioppo, Larsen, & Chartrand, 2003, see also Chapter 
4), and triggers responses across a broad array of sensory modalities (Bradley, 
Cuthbert, & Lang, 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993; 
Shapiro, Jamner, Goldstein, & Delfino, 2001).  
Negative information not only draws attention more easily, it also 
facilitates attention to other negative information, which may result in a vicious 
cycle of negative thinking that can prolong and intensify people’s negative 
emotional states (Bower & Mayer, 1989; Bradley et al., 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 1993; Siemer, 2005; Watkins, 2008). For example, individuals, who tend to 
engage in negative ruminative thinking after an initial negative event, display 
exacerbated depressive symptoms over time, and are at a higher risk of 
developing new depressive episodes (Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000). Moreover, people with such a ruminative response style were 
found to display poorer problem solving skills (Lyubomirsky et al., 1999), less 
cognitive flexibility (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) and increased 
procrastination (Ward, Lyubomirsky, Sousa, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). 
One explanation for the detrimental effects of negative information 
processing on human performance is the idea that emotions, for instance, 
through negative thought intrusions, draw upon limited information processing 
resources (Ellis, Moore, Varner, Ottaway, & Becker, 1997; Eysenck, Derakshan, 
Santos, & Calvo, 2007). More specifically, negative emotions may increase the 
allocation of attention to aversive information, at the cost of task-related 
information (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Joormann, 2004; Luu, Tucker, & 
Derryberry, 1998). In line with this, Meinhardt and Pekrun (2003) demonstrated 
how the amplitude of event-related brain potentials which indicate the allocation 
of attention to task-related processes, were smaller when participants performed 
a task in a negative compared to a neutral state. Paradoxically, the idea that 
negative emotions occupy limited processing resources has also been the 
starting point for research on an effective way to deal with negative emotions, 
namely distraction.  
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Distraction from Negative Emotion 
Whenever people direct their attention away from a focal event, they 
engage in distraction. Distraction depends on the availability of a compelling 
substitute to occupy one’s thoughts, in order to prevent the occurrence of 
unwanted thoughts (Gerin, Davidson, Christenfeld, Goyal, & Schwartz, 2006). In 
a comprehensive study of emotion regulation strategies, Parkinson and Totterdell 
(1999) observed that people may use various distracting activities, such as 
“making plans”, “tidy up” or “do something one has been putting off doing” as 
ways to regulate their negative emotional states (Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999). 
Despite negative emotions’ pervasive qualities, people thus indicate that they can 
actively regulate their negative emotional states by seeking out diverting 
activities. 
To account for the effects of distraction in dealing with depression, Nolen-
Hoeksema (1987) proposed a response styles theory. The theory suggests that 
individuals who distract themselves from their negative state will experience relief 
from their depressive symptoms, whereas individuals who engage in ruminative 
thinking in response to an initial negative emotional event will experience 
amplification and prolongation of their depressive states. Even though individuals 
may focus on their depressive symptoms to try to understand and repair this 
aversive state, according to response styles theory, this focus will often only 
make individuals more depressed. In contrast, distracting responses may take 
the individual's mind off his or her symptoms of depression, such that 
dysfunctional response patterns are prevented (Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1990, p.519).  
A number of research findings have confirmed the effectiveness of 
distraction strategies for regulating negative emotions (Glynn, Christenfeld, & 
Gerin, 2002; Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; 
Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). For instance, one study (Gerin et al., 2006) 
examined the effects of distraction on participants’ blood pressure responses to 
angry provocations. Following an anger induction, which resulted in a blood 
pressure rise, participants were asked to wait in an isolated cubicle. In the no-
distraction condition, the cubicle was devoid of any stimuli; in the distraction 
condition, the cubicle contained a panel on which more than 30 brightly colored 
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cards and posters were placed. In addition, magazines and small toys were 
placed in easy reach. Although blood pressure remained high for the participants 
who waited in the no-distraction condition, blood pressure levels returned to 
baseline quickly when participants waited in the distraction condition.   
Research has demonstrated the effectiveness of distraction across a 
wide range of activities, for example visualizing scenes such as walking through a 
shopping mall or sitting in a double-decker bus driving down the street  
(Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998), sorting cards 
(Morrow & Nolenhoeksema, 1990), responding to colored lights (Christenfeld, 
1997) and filling out bogus questionnaires (Glynn et al., 2002). Apparently then, 
the effects of distraction on emotion are not restricted to the engagement of a 
specific task type, but rely on more general aspects of attentional processing. As 
such, a deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms of distraction may 
be derived from basic theories of attention. 
 
A Working Memory Model of Distraction 
Attention may be defined as the enhanced processing of some aspects of 
the environment while ignoring others (Johnston & Dark, 1986). As such, 
attention selects from the constant stream of information, the information that is 
most relevant for current behavior. The concept of attention is among the most 
intensely studied topics within psychology and cognitive neuroscience (Corbetta 
& Shulman, 2002; Hopfinger, Buonocore, & Mangun, 2000; Posner & Petersen, 
1990). Attention is thought to be controlled by two mechanisms: Bottom-up 
processes that are driven by salient information properties and top-down 
processes that are controlled in accord with people’s ongoing plans and 
behaviors (Buschman & Miller, 2007; Corbetta & Schulman, 2002; Egeth & 
Yantis, 1997).  
Bottom-up attention filters select information on the basis of salient 
aspects that are likely to be important for adaptive behavior (Egeth & Yantis, 
1997). These could be aspects such as novelty, or predictability (Desimone & 
1995) or other features with a strong biological relevance (Öhman, 2007). The 
nervous system responds to these particular aspects in a strong and automatic 
manner, such that this information is prioritized in further processing (Li et al., 
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1993; Desimone et al., 1994). For instance, the enhanced neural activity of the 
human amygdalae in response to aversive stimuli is thought to underlie automatic 
vigilance for negative information (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Davis & Whalen, 
2001). 
Top-down attentional control, on the other hand, is directed by the plans 
and actions people are engaged in, and modulates the role of bottom-up attention 
filters (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Knudsen, 2007). Top-down control may be 
crucial for flexible behavior. Without top-down attentional control, people would 
be unable to adjust to new or complex situations, control their impulses, or resist 
temptations (Norman & Shallice, 1986). Moreover, top-down attentional control 
plays a central role in higher cognitive processes, such as executive functioning 
(Cohen et al., 1997), intelligence (Gray, Chabris, & Braver, 2003) and language 
(Baddeley, 2003). A key system in top-down control is working memory. Working 
memory is a mental device that holds a limited amount of information for periods 
of seconds such that this information can be evaluated and manipulated in 
accord with people’s behaviors and concerns (Baddeley, 1986).  
Working memory is of particular importance when different types of 
information compete over attention, and threaten to interfere with the current task 
goal (Teasdale, Proctor, Lloyd, & Baddeley, 1993, Unsworth & Engle, 2007). 
Working memory thus not only temporarily holds information for further 
processing, it also controls attentional capture of new information (Corbetta, 
Kincade, & Shulman, 2002; Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2007; 
Einhäuser, Rutishauser, & Koch, 2008). The control of working memory on 
attention increases when a central task becomes more demanding, such that 
salient information aspects that usually grab attention through bottom-up 
processes, but that do not bear any relevance to task performance, will less likely 
be processed under these demanding circumstances (Knudsen, 2007). For 
instance, researchers demonstrated how novel stimuli capture attention only 
when working memory load of a central task is low but not when it is high (Spinks, 
Zhang, Fox, Gao, & Tan, 2004).  
The relevance of working memory has long been established in research 
on ‘cold’ cognitive processes (Baddeley, 1986; Cohen et al., 1997; Prabhakaran, 
Narayanan, Zhao, & Gabrieli, 2000). Yet, the functions of working memory may 
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extend beyond the cognitive domain, and may also play a role in ‘hot’ emotion 
processing (Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Pessoa, 2008; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). 
The idea that emotion processes occupy working memory resources is 
increasingly accepted in the emotion literature (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001; LeDoux, 
1996; Ochsner & Gross, 2005, see also the previous section on the 
pervasiveness of negative emotions). In view of these findings, the use of 
working memory resources may also underlie distraction from negative emotions. 
In line with this reasoning, researchers (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007) 
proposed a working memory model of distraction from negative emotion. The 
basic assumption of the model is that task-related and emotion-related 
information compete over working memory resources because working memory 
capacity is limited. When working memory demands of other activities are low, 
processing of negative information will by default receive priority because of its 
adaptive value, and may accordingly impact people’s emotional states. However, 
when a focal task is more demanding, for example, because of its high 
complexity, more working memory resources are needed to perform the task 
effectively, such that less resources will be available for emotional processing. 
The unfolding of an emotional response to a negative event thus may depend on 
the availability of working memory resources. The working memory account of 
distraction from negative emotions leads to a number of theoretical implications. 
A first implication of the working memory model is that effective 
distraction may not only depend on the presence of a demanding task, but also 
on the degree to which a task incorporates working memory resources. Given 
that working memory capacity is a continuous variable, the involvement of 
working memory resources by a distracter task should have a linear impact on 
people’s negative emotional states, such that a highly demanding task reduces 
the intensity of people’s negative emotions to a greater degree than a moderately 
demanding task, whereas a moderately demanding task will still be more 
effective than a mildly demanding task. Moreover, research has shown that the 
involvement of working memory in a task can fluctuate over time (Ashcraft & Kirk, 
2001; Jostmann & Koole, 2006), such that dynamic changes in task demands can 
be expected to influence people's emotional states on a moment-to-moment 
basis.  
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A second implication is that the effects of working memory load on 
emotion may interact with emotional intensity. Strongly negative stimuli have an 
even stronger impact on information processing resources than mildly negative 
stimuli (Mogg et al., 2000; Schimmack, 2005). Therefore, people’s negative 
emotional states may not only be affected by varying task demands, but also by 
varying the intensity of negative information. If strongly negative information 
incorporates more working memory resources than mildly negative information, a 
working memory account thus implies that taxing people’s working memory with a 
highly demanding task should reduce people’s emotional responses to strongly 
negative stimuli to a greater degree than people’s responses to mildly negative 
emotional stimuli. 
A third implication of the working memory model is that taxing working 
memory may modulate the automatic vigilance for negative information. Even 
though negative information is generally more attention grabbing than positive or 
neutral information (Eastwood, Smilek & Merikle, 2001; Pratto & John, 1991), a 
working memory account of distraction from negative emotion suggests that 
attention to negative information may be attenuated when the information is 
irrelevant for current behavior. Given that working memory facilitates attention to 
task-relevant information, while it minimizes interference of task-irrelevant 
information, increasing working memory demand of a central task may thus result 
in decreased interference of negative information. Thus, although attention to 
negative information is assumed to be fast and automatic (Robinson & Compton, 
2006; Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003), a working memory account thus proposes that 
attention to negative information can be controlled by top-down working memory 
processes. 
A final implication of the working memory model is that working memory 
load may modulate emotional processing in the brain. The neural circuits of both 
working memory (DeFockert, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001; Duncan & Owen, 2000; 
Jonides et al., 1993) and emotion (Dalgleish, 2004; Damasio et al., 2000; 
Davidson et al., 2002) are well defined. Moreover, research suggests that 
cognitive mechanisms for attention interact with limbic regions in emotional 
processing (Hariri, Bookheimer, & Mazziotta, 2000; Mayberg et al., 1999; Northoff 
et al., 2004). If emotional information competes with non-emotional information 
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for the limited processing capacity of working memory, this may therefore be 
reflected in the dynamics of the brain systems involved. More specifically, a 
working memory account suggests that the increased engagement of working 
memory regions in response to greater task demands may go hand in hand with 
the decreased involvement of regions implicated in emotional processing.  
In summary, the working memory model holds that the competition of 
task-related and emotion-related processes over working memory resources can 
be influenced by varying both task demands as well as the intensity of emotional 
stimuli, such that distraction from negative emotion is the result of the dynamic 
interplay between these two processes. Moreover, taxing working memory should 
not only distract people from their negative emotional states, but should also lead 
to decreased attentional interference of task-irrelevant negative information. 
Finally, the interaction of cognitive and emotional circuits in the brain suggests 
that increased activation of working memory regions should modulate emotional 
brain responses.  
 
Empirical Support for a Working Memory Model of Distraction 
The present working memory account provides a new theoretical 
framework for the process of distraction from negative emotion. Nevertheless, a 
number of empirical findings provide some initial support for the various 
assumptions of the model.  
In a classic series of studies on the effect of nitrogen narcosis, or diver’s 
drunkenness, Baddeley and colleagues (1966) demonstrated that divers’ anxiety 
about being at open-sea deteriorated their underwater performance on a simple 
motor task (removing screws from a plate as quickly as possible), yet failed to 
affect their performance on a demanding verbal reasoning task (Baddeley & 
Flemming, 1976). Subsequently, Baddeley explained these divergent findings in 
terms of a limited resource model of attention, arguing that contrary to the simple 
screw-plate task, the reasoning task may have been sufficiently demanding to 
reduce attention to potentially worrying environmental cues (Baddeley, 2007).  
The first systematic exploration of the role of processing resources in 
distraction from negative emotion was conducted by Erber and Tesser (1992). 
These investigators examined the effect of the amount of effort that participants 
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invested in a distracter task. In two experiments, participants viewed an 
emotionally arousing film clip after which they solved math equations for ten 
minutes and then reported their moods. In one experiment effort investment in 
the math task was made more or less motivationally relevant to participants, by 
stating that effort was only mildly or highly indicative of performance. In the other 
experiment, task effort was manipulated by varying the complexity of the 
equations. In both experiments task effort was found to modulate negative mood, 
such that participants displayed less negative moods in response to the negative 
movie clip when they were told that task effort was instrumental for performance 
rather than performance unrelated, or when they subsequently solved complex 
rather than simple math equations.  
Erber and Tesser (1992) explained their findings in terms of a limited 
capacity model, arguing that: “... it may be that a task which requires the bulk of 
people’s cognitive resources ‘absorbs’ moods by preventing further 
preoccupation with mood-related thoughts” (p. 342). Such a limited resources 
account is consistent with the working memory model of distraction. However, 
Erber and Tesser’s findings may not be conclusive. Even though the investigators 
proposed a role for limited processing resources in distraction, they did not 
specify the exact nature of these resources. Moreover, although task effort is 
assumed to involve the allocation of working memory resources (Jansma, 
Ramsey, de Zwart, van Gelderen, & Duyn, 2007), varying task effort is no 
established manipulation of working memory load. Hence, a more systematic 
examination of the use of working memory resources in distraction from negative 
emotion would be to manipulate working memory load of a task directly. 
In a set of three experiments (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007) working memory 
load of a distracter task was systematically varied. In all three experiments, 
participants viewed a series of neutral, mildly negative, or strongly negative 
pictures, followed by a more or less demanding task (or no task) and a mood 
scale. Thus, the use of working memory resources in distraction could be 
examined on a moment to moment basis. The central prediction across the three 
experiments was that participants’ moods would be modulated by the working 
memory load of the distracter task, such that participants would report less 
negative moods when task load was high than when task load was low, or 
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absent. Because strongly negative stimuli engage more information processing 
resources than mildly negative stimuli (Schimmack, 2005), varying task load was 
predicted to have a greater moderating impact on mood responses to strongly, 
rather than mildly negative stimuli. Accordingly, participants’ momentary moods 
were expected to be the result of dynamic changes in the use of working memory 
resources for processing both the emotional stimuli and the distracter task. 
In the first experiment, the effect of working memory load on distraction 
was examined by manipulating the absence or presence of a math task. Hence, a 
math task followed a picture in only half of the trials, whereas the other half of the 
trials did not contain a task. In line with predictions, participants reported less 
negative moods after viewing negative pictures when they subsequently 
performed a math task rather than no math task. Performing a math task did not 
influence participants’ moods in response to neutral pictures. Moreover, 
participants still reported more negative moods in response to strongly negative 
pictures than to weakly negative pictures when a math task was absent. When a 
math task was present, participants reported equal amounts of negative moods to 
strongly and mildly negative pictures.  
In the second experiment the role of working memory load in distraction 
was examined by manipulating the complexity of the distracter task. Previous 
research has found that complex math tasks make greater demands on working 
memory capacity than simple math tasks (Ashcraft, Donley, Halas, & Vakali, 
1992). In half of the trials, neutral, mildly negative, and strongly negative pictures 
were followed by a complex math task whereas in the remaining trials, pictures 
were followed by a simpler math task. In line with a working memory model of 
distraction, participants reported less negative moods in response to negative 
pictures when they performed a complex rather than a simple math task. Task 
complexity did not influence participants’ moods in response to neutral pictures. 
Moreover, working memory load again interacted with emotional intensity, such 
that participants reported more negative moods in response to strongly rather 
than mildly negative pictures when they performed a simple math task, whereas 
participants reported equal amounts of negative mood when they performed a 
complex math task.  
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In the third experiment, the effect of working memory load on distraction 
was investigated by manipulating the predictability of a math task (Baddeley, 
Chincotta, & Adlam, 2001), such that following picture presentation, participants 
either performed an announced math task, a sudden math task or no task. When 
a task is unpredictable, people cannot rely on already activated knowledge 
structures from long-term memory. Consequently, more working memory 
resources have to be allocated to unpredictable tasks than to predictable tasks 
(Baddeley, Chincotta, & Adlam, 2001). Because working memory load in this 
experiment could vary between high load (sudden task), intermediate load 
(announced task) or, no load (no task), the investigators could examine the linear 
effect of working memory load on distraction from negative mood. In line with 
predictions, participants negative moods decreased with increasing working 
memory load of a task, such that participants reported most negative moods in 
response to negative pictures when no task was present, intermediate negative 
moods when they performed a predictable task, and least negative moods when 
they performed a sudden task. In addition, the effect of working memory load 
again interacted with emotional intensity. Whereas participants still reported more 
negative moods in response to strongly compared to mildly negative pictures 
when they performed a predictable task, or no task, they reported equal amounts 
of negative moods to strongly and mildly negative pictures when they performed 
a sudden task. 
In summary, across three experiments, variations in working memory 
load were found to moderate the impact of viewing negative pictures on mood 
(Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). Participants reported less negative moods after 
viewing negative pictures when they performed a complex task rather than no 
task, or a simple task. The moderating effect of performing a task on negative 
mood was stronger when the task was unpredictable, than when it was 
predictable. Finally, performing a task had a stronger moderating impact on 
negative mood when participants had viewed strongly rather than mildly negative 
pictures. In line with a working memory account, these experiments thus 
demonstrated how distraction from negative emotion is the result of a dynamic 
use of working memory resources by both task-related and emotion-related 
processes 
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Though an automatic vigilance account suggests that attention to 
negative information is fast and unintentional (Pratto & John, 1991), a working 
memory model of distraction predicts that when working memory load of a current 
task is high, attention to negative information can be attenuated when it bears no 
relevance for the task (Knudsen, 2007). This idea was tested in a recent set of 
studies (Van Dillen & Koole, 2008), in which people had to evaluate the gender of 
angry and happy facial expressions, while they concurrently performed a more or 
less demanding focal task. Working memory load of the task was manipulated by 
varying the presence or absence of a math task (Experiment 1) or by varying the 
mental rehearsal of a one- versus eight-digit number (Experiment 2). Emotional 
expression of the faces is irrelevant for performance on the gender-naming task. 
Accordingly, longer response latencies to angry than to happy faces index 
greater attentional interference of negative information (Pratto & John, 1991). In 
line with an automatic vigilance account, participants indeed responded more 
slowly to angry than to happy faces, but only when working memory load of the 
concurrent task was low. When working memory load was high, participants were 
as fast in response to angry as to happy faces. In line with a working memory 
account, working memory load thus modulated attentional interference of 
negative information. 
The foregoing findings provide initial support for a working memory model 
of distraction. By systematically varying both task demands and emotional 
stimulus intensity, it was demonstrated that changes in people’s moods could be 
explained by the dynamic use of working memory resources for both task-related 
and emotion-related processing (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). Moreover, it was 
shown that loading working memory not only modulated the intensity of people’s 
negative emotional states, but also the degree to which negative information 
interfered with attention (Van Dillen & Koole, 2008).  
Neuropsychological Support for a Working Memory Model of Distraction 
With the introduction of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), a 
powerful imaging technique has become available to examine the neural 
mechanisms of various psychological phenomena. Due to this development, 
knowledge about neuropsychological processes rapidly accumulates, and 
enables researchers to test increasingly refined predictions about the workings of 
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the brain. As such, the neural circuits of both working memory (DeFockert et al., 
2001; Jonides et al., 1993) and emotional processes (Dalgleish, 2004; Damasio 
et al., 2000) are now well understood. Moreover, research suggests that these 
circuits may oftentimes operate in a coordinated manner (Mayberg et al., 1999; 
Northoff et al., 2004). The assumption that both emotional and non-emotional 
information compete for the limited processing capacity of working memory, may 
therefore be tested in the brain. More specifically, a working memory account 
predicts that task load increases involvement of cognitive brain regions while it 
decreases the activity of brain regions involved in emotional processing. 
A recent experiment (Van Dillen, Heslenfeld, & Koole, 2008) investigated 
this idea using fMRI, such that participants’ brain responses could be measured 
throughout the experiment. In this experiment, which had a similar experimental 
design as the previously described series of studies on distraction (Van Dillen & 
Koole, 2007), participants received a set of 128 trials that consisted of a neutral 
or negative picture followed by either a simple or complex math equation and a 
mood scale. The imaging experiment replicated the effect of task load on 
subjective negative emotions (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007), such that participants 
reported less negative moods in response to negative pictures when they 
subsequently performed a complex rather than a simple math task.  
More importantly, task load was found to modulate emotional brain 
responses. Performing a complex task compared to a simple task attenuated 
responses to negative pictures in the bilateral amygdalae, and the right insula, 
such that activity in these regions no longer differentiated between negative and 
neutral valence. Inversely, performing a complex rather than a simple task 
resulted in increased activity in regions implicated in cognitive processing, for 
example the right dorsolateral frontal cortex and the superior parietal cortex. 
Subsequent correlation analyses revealed that during task performance, the 
decreased engagement of ‘emotional regions’ went hand in hand with the 
increased engagement of ‘cognitive regions’. Accordingly, the present findings 
demonstrate how working memory processes may underlie both cognitive and 
emotional systems of the human brain. In line with a working memory account, 
taxing working memory with a demanding task attenuated neural responses in 
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regions involved in emotional processing, while it resulted in increased activity in 
regions involved in cognitive processing. 
Other researchers have reported similar effects of working memory load 
on brain responses to painful stimuli (Bantick et al., 2002; Frankenstein, Richter, 
McIntyre, & Remy, 2001; Tracey et al., 2002; Valet, 2004). In one fMRI 
experiment, participants performed a counting Stroop task during which they 
received painful thermal stimulation. The counting Stroop task consisted of 
naming the number of words on screen regardless of the words’ meaning. 
Working memory load of the task was manipulated by varying the possible 
interference of the words with the counting task (Bush et al., 1998), such that in 
the high load condition, participants had to count interfering number words, e.g. 
‘eight’ or ‘five’, while in the low load task they had to count neutral words, e.g. 
‘cat’ or ‘frog’. Results showed that performing the interfering counting task 
compared to the neutral counting task, significantly reduced pain intensity scores 
to thermal stimuli, as well as activity in areas of the pain matrix (i.e., thalamus, 
insula, the anterior cingulate cortex, or ACC). The ACC is known to be involved 
not only in pain processing, but also in the allocation of attentional resources 
(Turken & Swick, 1999). Possibly, loading working memory thus modulates pain 
responses by attenuating attention to pain-related information. 
Even though the working memory model of distraction is a new 
theoretical framework, the foregoing neuropsychological experiments provide 
some initial support for its main assumptions. Moreover, these findings are in line 
with behavioral findings and demonstrate how taxing working memory may not 
only modulate emotional experiences and attention to negative information, but 
also emotional responses in the brain. 
 
When Distraction Fails 
The foregoing work suggests that taxing working memory with a 
demanding task often helps people to find relief from their negative emotional 
states. However, this strategy may not benefit all individuals at all times. For 
instance, in one study, depressed college students were able to distract 
themselves from negative unwanted thoughts initially, but eventually experienced 
a resurgence of depressive symptoms (Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988). This 
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resurgence could be explained by the fact that the students distracted 
themselves from their unwanted thoughts by entertaining other negative 
thoughts, even though they acknowledged that positive distracters would 
probably be more effective. Depressed individuals may experience difficulties 
selecting appropriate distracting activities because their depressive state 
enhances the accessibility of negative information (Joormann & Siemer, 2004; 
Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). In line with this, depressed students did 
engage in more positive distraction when this was provided by the investigators 
and was made highly accessible (Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988).  
In a similar vein, a growing body of research suggests that people with 
relatively low working memory capacity suffer more from the intrusive qualities of 
negative information than people with relatively high working memory capacity 
(Klein & Boals, 2001b; Feldman-Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004; Brewin & Smart, 
2005). Top-down working memory control is needed to discriminate task-relevant 
from task-irrelevant information on the basis of contextual cues (Unsworth & 
Engle, 2007). Individuals with low working memory capacity may thus experience 
difficulties regulating their negative emotional responses because they lack the 
resources to validly assess the relevance of negative information within a wider 
context (Brewin & Beaton, 2002; Conway & Engle, 1994; Dalgleish et al., 2007; 
Klein & Boals, 2001a; Unsworth & Engle, 2007).  
A model that highlights the significance of relevance checking is 
Scherer’s (2001) Sequential Evaluation Check (SEC). This model proposes that 
the nature of the unfolding response to an emotional stimulus depends on a 
series of appraisals of which the initial check is responsible for determining 
whether the stimulus will receive attention. Contrary to the prevailing literature on 
the negativity bias (Pratto & John, 1991), the SEC model suggests that this initial 
check is not about the valence of emotional stimuli, but rather about their 
relevance. Even though negative information commonly is highly relevant for 
people’s ongoing behavior and accordingly receives prioritized processing, this 
reasoning implies that negative information may be neglected when it has no 
implications for people’s current activities. In accord with a working memory 
account, the SEC model thus predicts that irrelevant negative information will less 
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likely be processed the more working memory demand of a central task 
increases (Van Dillen & Koole, 2008). 
Scherer’s sequential evaluation model (2001) implies that the more 
relevant emotional information will be for task performance, the more likely this 
information will receive attention. Indeed, several neuro-imaging studies have 
shown how the relevance of emotional stimuli for the task may modulate neural 
responses to these stimuli (Hariri, Bookheimer, & Mazziotta, 2000; Lange et al., 
2003; Nakamura et al., 1999; Northoff et al., 2004; Smith, Stephan, Rugg, & 
Dolan, 2006; Vuilleumier & Driver, 2007). For instance, in one fMRI study, 
Nakamura and colleagues (1999) showed how brain activity in the right inferior 
frontal cortex in response to emotional faces was affected by the evaluation 
instructions participants received, such that responses in these areas were 
greater when participants had to judge the expression valence of the faces than 
when they had to indicate their attractiveness, or the background color of the 
facial stimuli.  
In summary, although taxing working memory helps people distract 
themselves from negative emotion, distraction may not be effective for all 
individuals under all circumstances. One factor that may modulate the 
effectiveness of distraction may be the (perceived) relevance of negative 
information for people’s current behavior, such that negative information more 
likely impacts people’s emotional states when it is relevant, than when it is 
irrelevant.  
Conclusions and Future Directions 
Persistent negative emotions are a major cause of mental suffering 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Various theorists have suggested that the 
perseverance of negative emotional states can be at least partially explained by 
the strong impact of negative information on human information processing 
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 
1986). In line with this, the present analysis considered how controlling 
processing of negative information may be used to regulate negative emotional 
states. This analysis gave particular emphasis on the role of working memory 
processes in the control of negative information. More specifically, it was 
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suggested that the development of a negative emotional response may depend 
critically on the availability of working memory resources.  
Emotion regulation involves many domains of psychological functioning 
and the study of emotion regulation cuts across various scientific disciplines 
(Frijda, 1986; Gross, 2007; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). Accordingly, any theory on 
emotion regulation should aim at integrating findings from these various domains. 
By providing a working memory account, the present review combined and 
explained findings on distraction from negative emotions from diverse 
backgrounds and disciplines into a single theoretical framework. Moreover, the 
present review considered recent empirical tests of a working memory model of 
distraction across a range of response modalities, including subjective 
experience, brain activity and behavioral responses, in an attempt to encompass 
the breadth of emotion regulation phenomena. 
Distracting oneself by taxing working memory may be particularly 
effective to deal with the immediate impact of negative emotions, in order to cool 
down and view things from a more neutral perspective (Rice, Levine, & Pizarro, 
2007). Yet, distraction is unlikely to be the ultimate solution to all of people’s 
emotional problems. For instance, distraction may not be the most efficient way 
to deal with more structural causes of negative emotional states, such as low job 
satisfaction or family problems. Because taxing working memory leaves the 
source of negative emotional responses unchanged, responses to more stable 
negative situations may easily rebound once people cease to distract themselves 
(but see, Bonanno, Holen, Keltner, & Horowitz, 1995). Moreover, research has 
shown how structurally diverting attention away from a negative emotional 
experience, for example by suppressing it, or by keeping it secret, may result in 
detrimental effects on both mental and physical well-being (Pennebaker & 
Susman, 1988; Polivy, 1998; Wenzlaff, Rude, Taylor, Stultz, & Sweatt, 2001).  
On the contrary, by attending to negative experiences, for example by 
talking or writing about it, people have been found to find relief from mental 
suffering and show improved well-being (Donnelly & Murray, 1991; Esterling, 
Antoni, Fletcher, Margulies, & Schneiderman, 1994; Pennebaker & Chung, 
2007). In a similar vein, mindfulness training (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007; 
Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Teasdale, Segal, & Williams, 1995) teaches individuals to 
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become more aware of their negative thoughts and feelings, and to relate to them 
in a wider, decentered perspective as "mental events" rather than as aspects of 
the self (Teasdale et al., 2000, p.616). Consequently, people can detach from 
their negative depressive thoughts and prevent the escalation of negative 
thinking patterns.  
Some negative emotions are thought to trigger more negative ruminative 
thinking than other emotions. Because distraction from negative emotion is 
assumed to function through the reduction of negative thought intrusions (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1998; Siemer, 2005), the impact of distraction on specific emotions 
thus may vary. For example, shame responses more readily result in negative 
thinking patterns and impact people’s depressive mood more strongly than guilt 
responses, because shame involves a negative evaluation of the self in terms of 
internal, global, stable attributions whereas guilt involves the negative evaluation 
of a specific behavior in terms of more specific, unstable attributions, (Orth, 
Berking, & Burkhardt, 2006; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992). Possibly 
then, distracting people with a demanding task may be particularly desirable to 
prevent the negative consequences of shame, while distraction may be less 
appropriate for regulating guilt.  
In a related vein, emotional responses to positive events may not trigger 
ruminative thinking to the same degree as emotional responses to negative 
events (Feldman, Joormann, & Johnson, in press; Fiedler et al., 1993). In fact, 
positive emotional states are thought to impact people’s cognitions quite 
differently than negative emotions, resulting, for example, in increased cognitive 
flexibility (Baumann & Kuhl, 2005; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). Hence, a 
working memory model of distraction may have different implications for positive 
emotions than for negative emotions. In line with this, a recent set of studies 
failed to find an effect of working memory load on distraction from positive mood 
(Van Dillen & Koole, 2006; though see Erber & Tesser, 1992).  
One interesting question would be whether taxing working memory with a 
demanding task would not only regulate emotional states, but also bodily needs 
more generally, such as hunger, fatigue, or sexual arousal. For example, when 
working towards a solid deadline, people sometimes forget to eat, while people in 
a lively conversation may loose track of time and fail to notice they are getting 
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tired. Several studies on the role of attention in subjective pain experience 
provide some support for this idea (Christenfeld, 1997; Frankenstein et al., 2001; 
Bantick et al., 2002). Moreover, research on craving has demonstrated how 
desire-related thoughts, like negative thoughts, are particularly powerful in 
drawing attention and capturing working memory resources (Kavanagh, Andrade, 
& May, 2005). Possibly then, loading people’s working memory with a demanding 
task may similarly distract people from their cravings as they may distract people 
from their negative feelings. In support of this idea, May and colleagues (May, 
Andrade, Panabokke, & Kavanagh, 2004) found that visualizing a game of tennis 
reduced craving in smoking-deprived individuals. Future research is needed to 
examine the role of working memory in distraction from bodily needs. 
 
Coda 
At any moment in time, humans can only keep a few things in their 
minds. This is a basic aspect of human life. Ironically, this fundamental limitation 
of human information processing may also have some beneficial consequences. 
Because the processing of both emotional and non-emotional information depend 
on the availability of limited resources, people can distract themselves from their 
negative emotions by replacing these with an engaging task. As such, in dealing 
with negative feelings, people need not focus on what they are currently feeling, 
but instead may focus on what they are currently doing. 
 
Chapter 1 
 
 24
Overview of This Dissertation 
The present dissertation examines how processing of negative emotional 
information may depend on the availability of working memory resources. The 
central hypothesis under investigation is that the more working memory is being 
used by a distracting activity, the less room may remain for negative emotions to 
persist. In the current chapter (Chapter 1), the theoretical background and main 
empirical findings (as discussed in Chapters 2 to 4) of this working memory 
model of distraction from negative emotion were discussed, as well as some of its 
major limitations and implications. The remainder of the dissertation consists of 
the three empirical chapters that each deal with a specific aspect of a working 
memory model of distraction. Chapter 2 provides an initial test of the effect of 
loading working memory on people’s emotional experiences. Chapter 3 is aimed 
at replicating and extending the findings of Chapter 2 and examines the effect of 
working memory load on both emotional experience as well as circuits within the 
emotional brain. Finally, in Chapter 4, the effect of working memory load on 
attentional interference of negative information was investigated.  
The reader may find some repetition in the following chapters in terms of 
methodology and theoretical background. This is deliberate and allows for each 
chapter to be read without cross-referring to other chapters. Indeed, each of the 
following chapters comprises a published or submitted article that can be read on 
its own.  
  
 
 
  
  
 This chapter is based on Van Dillen, L.F., & Koole, S.L. (2007). Clearing the mind: a 
working memory model of distraction from negative mood. Emotion, 7, 715-723. 
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Clearing the mind: a working memory model of distraction 
from negative mood 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 28
 
Action seems to follow feeling, but really action and feeling go together; 
and by regulating the action, which is under the more direct control of the will, we 
can indirectly regulate the feeling, which is not. 
 
- William James (1899, p. 500)  
 
One of James’ important insights was that people’s actions and feelings 
are closely intertwined. Although feelings often prompt subsequent actions, 
actions influence feelings as well. For example, when people feel frustrated after 
a long day at work, they may exercise at the gym in order to feel better (Byrne & 
Byrne, 1993). By studying outside of campus, students can prevent being lured 
into the thrills and pleasures of student life (Fishbach & Shah, 2006). And by 
foregoing practice when feeling uncertain about their performance, people can 
shield themselves against the disappointment of failure (Jones & Berglas, 1978; 
Tice, 1991).  
In the present research, we highlight an additional way in which people’s 
actions may regulate their feelings. More specifically, we investigate how actions 
that load working memory can distract people from their negative moods. In the 
following paragraphs, we begin by reviewing previous research on distraction 
from emotion. Next, we suggest that a key aspect of distraction is the use of 
limited processing capacity in working memory. The more working memory is 
being used by a distracting activity, the less room will remain for negative moods 
to persist. To test this notion, we present three experiments that analyzed the 
effectiveness of varying demands on working memory in distracting individuals 
from negative mood. Notably, the present research focused on the regulation of 
negative mood, because of its relevance to understanding mood disorders like 
chronic anxiety and depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) and because regulation 
of negative mood has received most attention in the emotion regulation literature 
(Gross, 1998).  
Distraction from Emotion 
An act of distraction involves intentionally or unintentionally drawing one's 
attention away from a focal event. In the case of mood regulation, a distracting 
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activity draws the person’s attention away from his or her mood, so that the 
person’s mood becomes more neutral. As such, the concept of distraction plays 
an important role in leading theories of emotion regulation (Bishop, Duncan, & 
Lawrence, 2004; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Trask & Sigmon, 1999).  
Empirical research has confirmed that distraction can indeed have an 
important influence on people’s moods. For example, depressed individuals who 
are distracted from their dysphoric mood states show alleviation of their 
depressive symptoms (Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1990). Likewise, angry individuals who are distracted show reduced anger (Gerin, 
Davidson, Christenfeld, Goyal, & Schwartz, 2006; Rusting & Nolen–Hoeksema, 
1998). Distraction can also decrease individuals’ cardiovascular responses to 
negative mood (Gerin et al., 1996; Glynn et al., 2002).  
Unfortunately, distraction may not always be that easy. People often find 
it difficult to distract themselves from their negative moods (Fiedler, Nickel, 
Asbeck, & Pagel, 2003; Josephson, Singer, & Salovey, 1996; Wegner, Erber, & 
Zanakos, 1993). Indeed, many individuals engage in prolonged negative 
ruminations when they would prefer to entertain more pleasant thoughts (Koole, 
Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Kuhl, 1994; Martin & Tesser, 
1996). These and other observations suggest that distraction involves more than 
simply turning one’s attention elsewhere. Additional processes may be needed 
before distraction can be effective. 
For distraction to be successful, people’s feelings may need to be 
replaced by something else. In line with this idea, Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(1990) found that performing either motor movements (i.e., walking back and 
forth to sort giant cards) or a cognitive task both helped to distract participants 
from a previously induced depressive mood. However, the cognitive task was 
more effective than the motor movements in neutralizing participants' moods. To 
explain these findings, Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema suggested that participants 
could still ruminate about their negative moods while they were moving about. 
Accordingly, the motor task might not have fully distracted participants from their 
mood states. By contrast, performing the cognitive task required participants to 
generate task-related thoughts which replaced mood-related thoughts. Thus, 
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effective distraction may involve replacing emotionally charged thoughts with 
more neutral thoughts.  
The differential effectiveness of various distracting activities was further 
explored by Erber and Tesser (1992). These investigators manipulated the 
amount of effort that participants invested in distracting activities, such as solving 
math equations. Task effort was manipulated by making investment in the task 
more or less motivationally relevant to participants, or by varying the complexity 
of the task. The results showed that distracting activities were more effective in 
neutralizing positive and negative moods to the extent that participants invested 
high rather than low effort in the distracting activity. Effortful cognitive activities 
are thus more distracting than other types of activities, presumably because 
effortful cognitive activities leave little room for mood states to persist. 
 
A Working Memory Model of Distraction 
Through which mechanisms might effortful cognitive activities prevent the 
continuation of negative moods? In the present article, we suggest that working 
memory is a likely candidate. Working memory is an assembly of structures and 
processes that is used for temporarily storing and manipulating information in 
memory (Baddeley, 1986). Because the capacity of working memory is limited, 
different activities compete over its resources. The more working memory 
capacity is used by one activity, the less can be used by another concurrent 
activity. We suggest that the same principle applies to mood-related processing. 
The more working memory a person needs to perform a distracter task, the less 
working memory will be left to maintain the person's current mood state.  
Our working memory model of distraction from emotion assumes that 
mood-congruent cognitions are an integral part of the phenomenal experience of 
mood. This assumption has received strong empirical support: Negative affective 
states evoke mood-congruent cognitions (Blaney, 1986; Bower & Mayer, 1989; 
Siemer, 2005), even after the original stimulus that caused this state is no longer 
present (Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1996). People's cognitions thus often serve 
to sustain, and even intensify their initial negative affective response (Bradley et 
al., 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993; Siegle, Steinhauer, 
Thase, Stenger, & Carter, 2002). Indeed, in a recent study, self-reported negative 
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moods and mood-congruent cognitions were found to operate in a strictly parallel 
fashion (Siemer, 2005). The prevention of mood-congruent cognitions is thus a 
plausible mechanism that may underlie the effects of distraction. 
This working memory account has important implications for 
understanding how different task demands may influence distraction from 
negative mood. First, any changes in task demands should distract from negative 
mood primarily to the extent that these task demands implicate working memory 
capacity. Second, the extent to which people use their working memory capacity 
can vary dynamically from moment to moment (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001; Jostmann 
& Koole, 2006). It thus follows that dynamic changes in task demands can 
influence people's mood states on a moment-to-moment basis. Third, working 
memory capacity is a continuous variable, such that working memory can be 
used at low, medium, or high degrees (or take any intermediate value). 
Accordingly, a working memory account implies that varying task demands 
should have a linear effect on mood regulation. If a given task requires much 
working memory capacity, then distraction from negative mood should be 
relatively high. If a given task requires intermediate amounts of working memory 
capacity, then distraction from negative mood should be intermediate. If a given 
task requires low working memory capacity, then distraction from negative mood 
should be relatively low.  
A more subtle but equally important implication of the present account 
involves the impact of task demands on processing of negative stimuli that vary in 
emotional intensity. Negative stimuli are generally more attention-grabbing than 
neutral or positive stimuli (Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Pratto & John, 1991). This 
processing advantage is stronger for strongly negative stimuli than for mildly 
negative stimuli (Schimmack, 2005). Strongly negative stimuli trigger more mood-
congruent processing and, correspondingly, employ more working memory 
capacity than mildly negative stimuli (see for empirical evidence Klein & Boals, 
2001b). A working memory account thus predicts an interaction between task 
demands and emotional intensity of negative stimuli. Distracter tasks that occupy 
working memory capacity may exert a greater influence on emotional processing 
of strongly rather than weakly negative stimuli.  
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The Present Research and Hypotheses 
In the present research, we sought to test some of the predictions of the 
working memory model of distraction from negative mood. In three experiments, 
participants were presented with a series of neutral and negative pictures that 
varied in affective intensity. After viewing each picture, participants performed 
either a more or a less demanding task (or no task) and then reported their 
moods. Accordingly, the present research examined the role of distraction on 
moment-to-moment mood changes. 
In Study 1, we investigated the effect of task presence and exposure to 
strongly versus weakly negative pictures on participants’ moods. In line with a 
working memory model of distraction, we expected the intensity of negative mood 
reports to decrease when working memory load of a subsequent task would 
increase. Strongly negative pictures can be presumed to have a greater impact 
on working memory than weakly negative pictures (Schimmack, 2005). We 
therefore expected that a demanding task would attenuate participants’ negative 
moods to a greater degree in response to strongly rather than mildly negative 
pictures. 
Our main goal in Study 2 was to establish whether distraction depends 
on the amount of working memory capacity being used by the task, and not only 
on the redirection of attention away from the affective stimulus and towards the 
task. To this end, we experimentally varied the complexity of the distracting task 
by having participants solve both simple and more complex equations. In this 
way, we manipulated the amount of information to be held in working memory. In 
addition, we wanted to replicate the interaction between task demands and 
emotional intensity of negative stimuli. We thus expected complex tasks to have 
a greater impact on further processing of strongly negative stimuli than on further 
processing of weakly negative stimuli.  
In Study 3, we wanted to vary working memory load while keeping 
qualitative task parameters constant. Therefore, we varied working memory load 
by manipulating both the presence and the predictability of the math task. When 
a task is unpredictable, people cannot rely on already activated knowledge 
structures from long-term memory. Consequently, more working memory 
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capacity has to be allocated to unpredictable tasks than to predictable tasks 
(Baddeley, Chincotta, & Adlam, 2001). We predicted a linear effect of working 
memory load on distraction from negative mood: The more working memory 
capacity is used to perform a task, the less is used for mood-related processing, 
and thus the more a previously induced mood should decrease.  Predictable 
math tasks were hence expected to induce more distraction than no task, and 
unpredictable math tasks were expected to induce more distraction than 
predictable math tasks. 
Study 1 
Study 1 provided an initial investigation of the influence of working 
memory processes on moment-to-moment mood changes. Participants were 
presented with neutral or negative pictures, followed by either a math task or no 
task, upon which participants reported their moods. We expected participants to 
experience less intense negative moods in negative trials with a task, than in 
negative trials without a task. Moreover, because the math task was assumed to 
interfere with mood-congruent processing, we expected that the math task would 
not influence mood during neutral trials. Finally, we examined whether affective 
intensity and task presence would interact, as expected by a working memory 
account of distraction. We thus predicted that mood ratings after strongly 
negative pictures would be more attenuated by performing a distracting task than 
mood ratings after mildly negative pictures.  
 
Method 
Participants and Design  
Thirty-eight paid volunteers at the VU University Amsterdam (12 men and 
26 women, average age 22) took part in the experiment. The experimental design 
was 2 (math task: no task versus math task; within participants) x 3 (picture 
negativity: neutral, mildly negative, or strongly negative; within participants). The 
main dependent variables consisted of participants' negative mood ratings and 
their math performance.  
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Procedure and Equipment 
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were led to individual cubicles 
with a personal computer. The experimenter explained that the remaining 
instructions would be administered via a computer-program and left.  After a brief 
introduction and filling out some personality questionnaires, participants 
proceeded with a picture viewing task. During this task, participants were 
presented with either neutral or negative pictures. These pictures had been 
selected from the International Affective Picture System (Lang et al., 2001). 
Based on published normative valence ratings (ranging on a scale of 1 [most 
unpleasant] to 9 [most pleasant]), we selected two sets of 60 pictures, namely a 
negative set (valence ratings under 2.50) and a neutral set (valence ratings 
between 4.00 and 5.00). The negative pictures were further divided into two 
categories of either strong negative valence (30 pictures with normative IAPS 
scores lower than 2.20) or mild negative valence (30 pictures with normative 
IAPS scores of 2.20 and higher). In this way, we investigated whether the 
affective intensity of the pictures would differentially impact mood ratings in trials 
with, and without a task. Negative pictures included images of scenes with burn 
victims, physical assaults, and angry faces. Neutral pictures depicted scenes of 
people in conversation, scenes of nature or buildings, household objects, and 
neutral faces.  
The picture viewing task consisted of 120 trials. During each trial, a 
negative or neutral picture appeared on screen for 4 seconds. During half of the 
trials, participants also had to solve a math task after viewing the picture. In 
between the picture and the math task, an announcement of the math task was 
displayed on the screen for one second. The math task consisted of a moderately 
complex equation, such as ‘2*8 + 12 = 28’. Each equation combined a summation 
or subtraction with a product or a division. Participants judged whether the 
equation was correct by a keyboard response. Participants had 4 seconds to 
make this response. Both participants’ responses and their response times were 
recorded. At the end of each trial, participants rated, with a keyboard response, 
how unpleasant they felt at that moment on a 9 point scale (1 = not at all, to 9 = 
very much). In between trials, participants were asked to relax for 4 seconds. 
Before the 120 experimental trials, participants first received four practice trials to 
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become familiar with the task. After the picture viewing task, participants were 
thanked for their efforts, debriefed, and paid by the experimenter. 
 
Results 
Math performance  
A 3 (picture negativity) ANOVA showed no effect of picture negativity on 
participants’ correct responses, F(2, 36) < 1, or on participants’ response times, 
F(2, 36) = 1.76, ns. 
 
Negative mood  
We only analyzed the correct trials (74 %) to rule out possible influences 
of erroneous responding on participants’ negative mood ratings. For instance, 
giving a wrong response might increase participants’ negative moods. 
Throughout Studies 1-3, analyses of all trials or the incorrect trials did however 
not yield any differential results. Relevant means are displayed in Table 1.  
To analyze participants moods, we conducted a 2 (math task) x 3 (picture 
negativity) ANOVA of participants’ mood ratings. This analysis yielded a main 
effect of picture negativity: F(2, 36) = 69.56, p < .001. As expected, contrast 
analyses revealed a linear effect of picture negativity, F(1, 37) = 134.52, p < .001, 
such that participants reported most negative moods after strongly negative 
pictures (M = 4.67), less negative moods after mildly negative pictures (M = 4.44) 
and the least negative moods after neutral pictures (M = 2.56).  
The ANOVA further yielded the predicted interaction between task and 
picture negativity, F(2, 36) = 28.60, p < .001. We proceeded by analyzing the 
effect of task separately for each picture negativity condition. Analysis of the 
neutral pictures yielded no effect of task, F(1, 37) = 1.21, ns. We therefore 
focused our further analyses solely on the negative trials. In the negative trials, 
the analyses produced an effect of task for both the strongly negative, as well as 
the mildly negative trials (F(1, 37) = 60.35, p < .001 and F(1, 37) = 38.92, p < 
.001, respectively). These effects indicate that, across both strongly and mildly 
negative trials, participants reported less negative moods in negative trials with a 
task, than in negative trials without a task.  
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Table 1. Mean Negative Mood as a Function of Picture Negativity and Task (Study 1; 
Standard Deviations between Brackets) 
                    Picture Negativity 
Task Neutral 
 
Mild 
 
Strong 
Absent 
2.58a 
(1.13) 
4.82b 
(1.64) 
5.32c 
(1.84) 
Present 
2.55a 
(1.17) 
4.06d 
(1.47) 
4.01d 
(1.59) 
Note. Ratings ranged from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). Means that do not share 
subscripts differ within rows and columns at p < .05. 
 
Another valid way to interpret the picture negativity by task interaction in 
the negative trials is to consider the effect of picture negativity separately for each 
task condition. This analysis yielded an effect for picture negativity in the negative 
trials without a task F(1, 37) = 28.45, p < .001. In these trials, participants 
reported significantly less intense negative moods following mildly negative 
pictures (M = 4.83) than following strongly negative pictures (M = 5.32). There 
was, however, no effect of picture negativity on negative mood in trials with a 
task, F(1, 37) <1. (M = 4.01 and M = 4.07 respectively for mildly versus strongly 
negative pictures). Thus, strongly negative pictures only elicited more negative 
moods than mildly negative pictures in trials without a math task. In trials with a 
math task, strongly and weakly negative pictures induced equal amounts of 
negative mood.  
Discussion 
The results of Study 1 showed the predicted effects of task presence on 
moment-to-moment ratings of negative mood. In line with a working memory 
model, participants reported less negative moods after negative pictures followed 
by a math task than when negative pictures were not followed by a task. 
Performing a math task did not influence participants’ moods during neutral trials. 
Also in line with a working memory model, performing a math task interacted with 
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the intensity of the negative pictures. Specifically, participants’ moods after 
strongly negative pictures were more attenuated by performing a math task than 
moods after mildly negative pictures. Indeed, when a task was present, mood 
ratings after strongly negative pictures no longer differed from mood ratings after 
mildly negative pictures. This is in line with the idea that strongly negative 
pictures have a greater impact on working memory capacity than mildly negative 
pictures, so that the processing of these pictures should be affected more by 
additional working memory demands.  
 
Study 2 
Although the results of Study 1 fit with a working memory model of 
distraction, Study 1 only manipulated the presence or absence of a demanding 
task. As such, it is hard to say whether the effects of task presence on negative 
mood resulted from variations in processing capacity, as our analysis suggests, 
or whether these effects resulted merely from an attentional shift away from the 
current mood state. We conducted Study 2 to address this ambiguity.   
In Study 2, participants solved a math equation in each trial. To vary 
involvement of working memory, we manipulated task complexity during the 
different trials. In half of the trials, neutral and negative pictures were followed by 
the same math equations as in Study 1. In the remaining trials, pictures were 
followed by much simpler equations. Previous research has found that complex 
math tasks make greater demands on working memory capacity than simple 
math tasks (Ashcraft, Donley, Halas, & Vakali, 1992). Thus, if the effects of the 
math tasks in Study 1 were due to their differential demands on working memory 
capacity, distraction from negative moods should be greater after performing 
complex rather than simple math tasks. On the other hand, if the results of Study 
1 were due mainly to a shift in attention away from the negative mood state, 
performing complex and simple math tasks should induce similar levels of 
distraction from negative moods.  
Study 2 again examined whether picture negativity and task presence 
would interact. As in Study 1, we predicted that mood ratings after strongly 
negative pictures would be more attenuated by task complexity than mood 
ratings after mildly negative pictures. 
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Method 
Participants and Design  
Thirty-nine paid volunteers at the VU University Amsterdam (7 men and 
32 women, average age 20) took part in the experiment. The experimental design 
was 2 (task complexity: simple versus complex) x 3 (picture negativity: neutral, 
mildly negative, or strongly negative), both factors within participants. The main 
dependent variables consisted of participants' negative mood ratings and their 
math performance.  
 
Procedure and Equipment 
The procedure of Study 2 was similar to Study 1. Participants again 
performed the picture viewing task. This time, all pictures were followed by a 
math task. The complexity of the math task was varied experimentally. In half of 
the trials, the math task consisted of an equation similar to the moderately 
complex equations used in study 1, such as ‘2*8 + 12 = 28’. Each of these 
equations always combined a summation or subtraction with a product or a 
division. In the remaining trials, the math task consisted of a much simpler 
equation, such as ‘7 + 2 = 9’. Each of these equations only consisted of either a 
summation or a subtraction.  
Results 
Math performance  
A 2 (task complexity) x 3 (picture negativity) ANOVA revealed a main 
effect for task complexity, F(1, 38) = 234.41, p < .001. This effect can be seen as 
a manipulation check. Participants performed better on the simple math trials 
than on the complex math trials (M = 96% correct versus M = 70% correct), 
irrespective of picture negativity. Participants were also faster on the simple math 
equations than on the complex math equations, F(1, 38) = 1770.78, p < .001 (M = 
1932 ms versus M = 3021 ms).  
 
Negative mood.   
We analyzed negative mood ratings in a 2 (task complexity) x 3 (picture 
negativity) ANOVA. Relevant means are displayed in Table 2. In this analysis, we 
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again only used affect ratings of the correctly answered math-trials (83% of all 
responses). The analysis revealed a main effect of picture negativity on 
participants’ mood ratings: F(2, 37) = 52.05, p < .001. A contrast analysis 
revealed the expected linear effect of picture negativity, F(1, 38) = 86.13, p < 
.001. On average, participants reported strongest negative moods after trials with 
strongly negative pictures, intermediate negative moods after mildly negative 
pictures, and least negative moods after trials with neutral pictures (respectively 
M = 4.31, M = 4.06 & M = 2.65).  
 
Table 2. Mean Negative Mood as a Function of Picture Negativity and Task Complexity 
(Study 2; Standard Deviations between Brackets) 
Picture Negativity 
Task Neutral Mild Strong 
Simple 
2.61a 
(1.00) 
4.16b 
(1.26) 
4.71c 
(1.43) 
Complex 
2.66a 
(1.12) 
3.97bd 
(1.31) 
3.92d 
(1.38) 
Note. Ratings ranged from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). Means that do not share 
subscripts differ within rows and columns at p < .05. 
 
 
The ANOVA further yielded the predicted interaction between task 
complexity and picture negativity, F(2, 37) = 13.62, p < .001. We again did not 
find an effect of task complexity in the neutral trials, F < 1. To better understand 
the interaction, we proceeded by analyzing the negative trials (mildly versus 
strongly negative). We first analyzed the effects of task complexity separately in 
each negativity condition. These analyses did not yield a significant effect of task 
complexity in the mildly negative trials, F(1, 38) = 2.64, ns.. Nevertheless, at a 
descriptive level, participants did report less negative moods in response to 
mildly negative pictures followed by a complex task (M = 3.97) rather than a 
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simple task (M = 4.16). By contrast, the analyses revealed a highly significant 
effect for task complexity in the strongly negative trials, F(1, 38) = 29.13, p < .001. 
Participants reported less negative moods after strongly negative pictures 
followed by a complex math equation rather than a simple math equation (M = 
3.92 versus M = 4.71).  
As in Study 1, we then considered the effect of picture negativity (mildly 
versus strongly negative) separately for each task condition. In the negative trials 
with a simple task, the analysis yielded an effect for picture valence, F(1, 38) = 
21.05, p < .001. In trials containing a simple task, participants reported more 
negative moods following strongly negative pictures than following mildly 
negative pictures (M = 4.71 versus M = 4.16). By contrast, in negative trials with a 
complex task, there was no effect of picture valence on participants’ negative 
moods, F(1, 38) < 1. In trials containing a complex task, participants reported as 
much negative mood in response to strongly negative pictures as in response to 
mildly negative pictures  (M = 3.97 versus M = 3.92).  
Recall that we found an effect of task complexity on participants’ 
response times. To rule out that differences in task duration could explain the 
effect of task complexity on negative mood ratings in the negative trials, we 
therefore repeated our analyses with participants’ response time differences 
between the complex and the simple trials as a covariate. A 2 (task complexity) 
ANCOVA analysis of the negative mood ratings in the negative trials still revealed 
a strong effect for task complexity, (F(1, 38) =  27.07, p < .001). Moreover, when 
entered as a covariate, response time differences were unable to account for the 
effects of task complexity on negative moods, F(1, 37) < 1. 
 
Discussion 
The results of Study 2 replicate and extend Study 1. Because each trial 
now contained a math task, we could investigate the impact of varying working 
memory load on negative mood. In line with predictions, participants reported 
less negative moods after strongly negative pictures followed by a complex task 
than after strongly negative pictures followed by a simple task. Participants also 
reported somewhat less negative moods in response to mildly negative pictures 
followed by a complex rather than a simple task. However, the latter effect of task 
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complexity did not reach statistical significance. Thus, while an increase in task 
complexity resulted in a decrease in mood ratings across both strongly and mildly 
negative pictures, this decrease was much smaller for mildly negative pictures. 
This is in line with the assumption that an increase in working memory load 
should have a greater impact on additional processing of strongly negative stimuli 
than on additional processing of weakly negative stimuli. These findings thus 
further support our working memory model of distraction from negative mood.  
A possible confound in Studies 1 and 2, however, was task duration. As 
the results showed, participants took less time to solve simple equations than to 
solve complex equations. Although the effects of task complexity remained 
unchanged when we statistically controlled for this difference, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that qualitative differences between the two types of equations, 
other than their complexity, impacted participants’ moods. This problem could not 
simply be resolved by using shorter timeframes, because doing so might make 
the complex task too difficult, and thereby undermine participants' motivation to 
invest effort in the task. We therefore took another approach in Study 3 to 
address this problem. 
Study 3 
In Study 3, we varied the predictability of the complex math task that was 
used as a distraction, while keeping all other task parameters constant. 
Unannounced or novel stimuli make greater demands on central executive 
resources, and thus on working memory (Baddeley et al., 2001; Spector & 
Biederman, 1976). In this regard, it is important to note that, in our experiments, 
participants had limited time (4 seconds) to perform the math task. Even though 
one can argue that in absolute terms, announced and unannounced math tasks 
require the same amount of working memory, announced math tasks entail 
working memory earlier, but more evenly distributed over time. Unannounced 
math tasks under a time limit on the other hand, ‘pull up’ all required working 
memory at once, thus making a much greater demand on total working memory 
capacity at one moment. Unannounced tasks should hence be more potent 
distracters from negative mood than announced tasks. An important advantage of 
this approach was that, because the actual task was always the same, this ruled 
out possible confounding factors due to qualitative differences between tasks. 
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Another advantage of varying task predictability was that we could 
examine the linearity of the effect of working memory load on negative mood. We 
manipulated task predictability by randomly presenting trials without a task, trials 
with an announced task, and with an unannounced task. On the basis of our 
working memory model of distraction from negative mood, we expected 
participants to report least negative moods in the negative trials with an 
unannounced task (high working memory load), intermediate negative moods in 
the negative trials with an announced task (intermediate working memory load), 
and most negative moods in negative trials without a task (no working memory 
load).  
Finally, as in Studies 1 and 2, we predicted that higher working memory 
load would interfere especially with the further processing of strongly negative 
pictures. We therefore expected that strongly negative pictures would induce 
more negative moods than mildly negative pictures especially in trials where 
working memory load was low, or absent, such as in the trials with the announced 
task or no task. By contrast, we predicted that strongly negative pictures would 
induce equally negative moods as mildly negative pictures in trials where working 
memory load was high, such as in the trials with an unannounced math task.   
 
Method 
Participants and Design  
Forty paid volunteers at the VU University Amsterdam (12 men and 28 
women, average age 20) took part in the experiment. The experimental design 
was 3 (task type: unannounced, announced , or no task) x 3 (picture negativity: 
neutral, mildly negative, and strongly negative), both within participants. The 
main dependent variables consisted of participants' math performance and their 
negative mood ratings.  
 
Procedure and Equipment 
The procedure was similar as in Studies 1 and 2. This time, one third of 
the neutral and negative pictures were followed by an unannounced math task, 
one third by an announced math task, while the remaining pictures were not 
followed by a math task. To announce the math task, the word ‘som’, which is 
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Dutch for ‘calculation’, was displayed on screen one second before the task 
appeared. In this way, we experimentally varied the predictability of the math 
task. The math task following two-thirds of the pictures consisted of equations 
similar to the equations used in Study 1 and the complex equations used in Study 
2.  
Results 
Math performance  
A 3 (task type) x 3 (picture negativity) ANOVA revealed a main effect for 
task type on math performance, F(2, 38) = 40.98, p < .001. Participants gave 
more correct responses in the announced math trials than in the unannounced 
math trials (M = 73% versus M = 65%). The analyses revealed no effect for task 
type on response times. Thus, participants solved the announced math tasks 
equally quickly as the unannounced math tasks, F (2, 38) = 1.55, ns, (M = 2474 
versus M = 2534).  
 
Negative mood.   
We analyzed participants’ negative mood ratings in a 3 (task type) x 3 
(picture negativity) ANOVA for repeated measures. In this analysis, we again only 
used mood ratings of the correctly answered math-trials (79% of all responses). 
Relevant means are displayed in Table 3. The analysis yielded a main effect for 
picture negativity: F(2, 38) = 70.40, p < .001. The analysis further yielded the 
expected interaction between picture negativity and task type, F(4, 36) = 4.26, p < 
.01. 
In order to understand these effects, we proceeded by analyzing the 
effect of picture negativity and task type separately using linear contrast 
analyses. As in Studies 1 and 2 these analyses yielded a linear effect for picture 
negativity, F(1, 39) = 125.46, p < .001. Participants reported more negative 
moods after strongly negative pictures than after mildly negative pictures (M = 
4.96 versus M = 4.52) and least negative moods after neutral pictures (M = 2.94).  
Furthermore, in line with our predictions, there was a linear effect for task 
type for both the strongly negative, as well as the mildly negative trials (F(1, 39) = 
19.46, p < .001 and F(1, 39) = 33.19, p < .001, respectively). Thus, participants’ 
negative moods linearly decreased as working memory load increased, 
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irrespective of the intensity of the negative pictures. As in Studies 1 and 2, we did 
not find a linear effect for task type on the mood ratings in the neutral trials F (1, 
39) = 2.01, n.s.. Accordingly, we restricted our further analyses exclusively to the 
negative trials. 
Next, we considered the effect of picture negativity (mildly versus strongly 
negative) separately by task type. This analysis revealed a significant effect for 
picture negativity on the negative mood ratings in trials containing an announced 
task, F(1, 39) = 21.30, p < .001, and trials without a task, F(1, 39) = 29.40, p < 
.001. By contrast, there was no effect for picture negativity on the mood ratings in 
the trials containing the unannounced task, F(1, 39) < 1. Thus, when trials 
contained an announced task, or no task, participants reported significantly less 
negative mood after mildly negative pictures (M = 4.52 versus M = 4.78 for 
announced, and no tasks) than after strongly negative pictures (M = 5.12 versus 
M =5.35 for announced, and no tasks). In negative trials with an unannounced 
task, however, participants’ negative moods after strongly negative pictures (M = 
4.40) did not differ significantly from their moods after mildly negative pictures (M 
=4.26).  
 
Table 3. Mean Negative Mood as a Function of Picture Negativity and Task Type (Study 3; 
Standard Deviations between Brackets) 
                                 Picture Negativity 
Task Type Neutral Mild Strong 
No task 3.09a 
(1.55) 
4.78b 
(1.73) 
5.35d 
(1.94) 
         Announced task 2.88a 
(1.32) 
4.52c 
(1.83) 
5.12e 
(1.94) 
Sudden task 2.92a 
(1.27) 
4.26f 
(1.70) 
4.40f 
(1.73) 
Note. Ratings ranged from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). Means that do not share 
subscripts differ within rows and columns at p<.05. 
Clearing the mind 
 
 45 
Discussion 
In Study 3, we manipulated working memory load by varying task 
predictability, while the actual task was always the same. In this way, Study 3 
controlled for qualitative differences between tasks such as duration. As 
expected, working memory load had a linear effect on participants’ negative 
mood ratings. Participants reported more negative moods after negative pictures 
without a subsequent task (no load) than after negative pictures followed by an 
announced task (intermediate load), while they reported even less negative 
moods in trials with an unannounced task (high load). Moreover, in the trials with 
an unannounced task, participants reported as much negative moods after 
strongly negative pictures as after mildly negative pictures. In the trials with an 
announced task or no task, participants reported more negative moods after 
strongly negative pictures than after mildly negative pictures. Apparently, when 
task load was high, strongly negative pictures no longer elicited more mood-
related processing than mildly negative pictures.  
 
General Discussion 
In the present research, we proposed that people can distract themselves 
from negative feelings by loading their working memory capacity. In line with this 
model, three experiments showed that variations in working memory load 
moderate the impact of viewing negative pictures on mood. Participants reported 
less negative moods after viewing negative pictures when they had to solve 
complex math problems rather than no math problems (Study 1) or simple math 
problems (Study 2). The moderating effect of math problems on negative mood 
was stronger for unannounced math problems, which presumably use more 
working memory capacity (Spector & Biederman, 1976), than for announced 
math problems (Study 3). Solving math problems had no effect on mood after 
participants viewed neutral pictures (Studies 1-3). Finally, solving math problems 
had a stronger moderating impact on negative mood when participants had 
viewed strongly rather than mildly negative pictures (Studies 1-3). The latter 
findings fit well with a working memory model, given that strongly negative stimuli 
use greater working memory capacity than mildly negative stimuli (Schimmack, 
2005).  
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The present studies show that distraction from negative mood involves 
more than simply redirecting one’s attention away from the emotional stimulus. 
However, we do not mean to say that attention is irrelevant to distraction from 
negative mood. Processes of selective attention are critical for the operation of 
working memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 
1999). This can be illustrated by the way we manipulated working memory in our 
research, namely by varying the complexity or the predictability of a distracter 
task. When performing a simple or predictable task, people can rely on more 
habitual processes, such that attention can still shift to mood-related information. 
When people are confronted with a more complex, or unexpected task, however, 
people can no longer rely on habitual processes, but instead need to focus their 
full attention on the task (Baddeley, 1996; Norman & Shallice, 1980).  
The present findings fit well with neuropsychological findings about the 
interaction of higher cognitive mechanisms for attention and controlled 
processing with (lower limbic) regions involved in emotional processing (Cohen, 
Lohr, Paul, & Boland, 2001; Drevets & Raichle, 1998; Mayberg et al., 1999). For 
example, participants, when they had to judge emotional pictures on some non-
valenced criteria, namely picture format, displayed less involvement of limbic 
regions while watching the affective pictures, than when they had to judge the 
pictures’ valence, or had to indicate if the pictures evoked any feelings (Northoff 
et al., 2004). Increased involvement of the cognitive system may thus lead to a 
decreased involvement of the emotional system (Hariri, Bookheimer, & Mazziotta, 
2000; Northoff et al., 2004), and vice versa (Bishop, Duncan, & Lawrence, 2004; 
Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Mitchell, Richell, Leonard, & Blair, 2006).  
It is informative to compare distraction with suppression of emotional 
thoughts, another well-established emotion regulation strategy (Roemer & 
Borkovec, 1994; Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988). In both strategies, people 
alter their emotional states by preventing emotion-related cognitions to enter 
awareness. However, during emotional thought suppression, the active inhibition 
of emotional thoughts may actually make emotion-related material more 
accessible (Howell & Conway, 1992; Wenzlaff et al., 1988), resulting in mood 
rebounds (Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993; Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003). Because 
distraction does not require the active suppression of emotional thoughts, it 
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should not result in mood rebounds. In support of this, research has shown that 
when people were distracted following a negative mood induction, subsequent 
rumination did not again deteriorate their moods. When people however 
ruminated immediately after the negative mood induction, their negative mood 
states persisted (Trask & Sigmon, 1999).  
Although distraction seems a relatively efficient emotion regulation 
strategy, it may not necessarily be the most optimal approach under all 
circumstances. First, for a distracter task to be effective, it should not elicit 
negative feelings by itself. Ashcraft and Kirk (2001), for example, demonstrated 
that people high on math-anxiety performed more poorly on a math task than 
people low on math anxiety, because anxious thoughts incorporated working 
memory capacity and thus interfered with efficient task performance. For people 
high on math anxiety then, the math task no longer functioned as a neutral 
cognitive distracter, but as a negative affective stimulus in itself, producing 
negative feelings instead of replacing them with neutral thoughts. Low 
emotionality of the distracter task is therefore an important boundary condition for 
distraction from negative mood. 
Second, distraction may not be the most effective way to resolve more 
structural causes of negative mood, such as, for example, problematic 
relationships, or difficulties at work. This is because distraction leaves the source 
of the negative emotion itself intact. In highly distressing situations, it may be 
helpful to distract oneself initially, in order to step back and put things in 
perspective. In the end, however, distraction is no substitute for problem solving. 
For example, workaholics often explain their excessive work habits by stating that 
it helps them forget about problems in their private life (Robinson, 2001). At the 
same time, there exists an inverse relationship between marital satisfaction and 
obsessive working in the research literature (Matthews, Conger, & Wickrama, 
1996; Robinson, 2001). In these and related instances, distraction from negative 
mood may actually contribute to a vicious cycle of maladaptive behavior. 
Identifying the costs and benefits of distraction from negative mood clearly 
constitutes an important task for future research.   
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Limitations and Future Perspectives 
The present research demonstrates how increasing working memory 
load of a distracter task may attenuate negative mood. It is not clear, however, 
whether the model also applies to distraction from positive mood. Recent studies 
in our lab, using a similar paradigm as the present studies, failed to find an effect 
of working memory load on positive mood (Van Dillen & Koole, 2006; though see 
Erber & Tesser, 1992). As such, distraction from positive mood may not operate 
according to the same principles as distraction from negative mood. It is 
conceivable that positive emotional stimuli may impact cognitive processes 
through a different route than negative emotional stimuli (Isen, 2002). For 
example, positive emotional states do not always result in mood-congruent 
processing (Fiedler et al., 2003), and can increase both cognitive flexibility 
(Baumann & Kuhl, 2005), as well as distractibility (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). 
Clearly, the question how distraction from positive mood may operate deserves 
more attention in future research.  
Although the present research demonstrated that distraction can 
attenuate negative moods in response to negative pictures, distracted 
participants still reported less negative moods in response to neutral pictures. 
Physiological responses to emotional stimuli take several minutes to return to 
baseline, even when people are distracted (Glynn et al., 2002). These 
physiological responses may thus continue to impact participants’ negative 
moods after four seconds, the interval we used between the picture display and 
the mood scale. Extending this interval from several seconds to several minutes 
may effectively reduce negative mood to neutral levels. In line with this, Erber 
and Tesser (1992) found a complete neutralization of negative mood when 
participants solved moderately complex math equations for ten minutes after the 
mood induction. The exact relationship between the duration and the 
effectiveness of distraction from negative moods represents a fruitful topic for 
future inquiry. 
Future work is also needed to clarify the effects of type of working 
memory load on distraction from emotion. Baddeley and colleagues (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974) proposed that working memory consisted of two storage buffers (the 
phonological loop for verbal information and the visuospatial sketchpad for 
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nonverbal information), which are assumed to be relatively independent. For 
example, anxiety has been shown to have a disproportionate effect on verbal 
working memory while leaving visuospatial working memory performance 
(implicated in nonverbal working memory) unaffected (Ikeda, Iwanaga, & Seiwa, 
1996). Thus, verbalization of mood-related information seems to interfere 
particularly with verbal working memory (Gray, 2001). Further research should 
address whether a distracter task that implicates a different working memory 
device than mood-related processing still results in attenuation of negative 
moods.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
In everyday life, the effectiveness of distraction from negative mood is 
widely recognized, given that people are often advised to ‘move on’ when in a 
negative state by seeking out alternative activities. Nevertheless, distraction is 
typically used as an explanatory construct rather than as a phenomenon that 
needs to be explained. In the present research, we sought to deepen our 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms of distraction from negative mood 
by proposing a working memory model. By loading working memory, people can 
attenuate the impact of negative events on their moods. Thus, in keeping with 
William James’ early observations on the close interplay between actions and 
feelings, the present research highlights distraction as one important type of 
action through which people may regulate their feelings.  
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Negative emotional experiences are an inescapable aspect of human life. 
Although brief episodes of negative emotions can be adaptive (Öhman, 2007), 
negative emotions may become problematic when they persist over time. Indeed, 
there is mounting evidence that enduring negative emotional states impair both 
psychological and physical health (Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999; 
Sapolsky, ). It is therefore vital for people to develop ways of effectively dealing with 
negative emotion.  
One important way of dealing with negative emotion consists of minimizing 
the amount of attentional resources that are devoted to processing negative 
information (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Van Dillen 
& Koole, 2007). More specifically, performing an attention-demanding task has been 
found to attenuate the emotional impact of negative stimuli (Erber & Tesser, 1992; 
Erthal et al., 2005; Glynn, Christenfeld, & Gerin, 2002; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1990; Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez & Ungerleider, 2002; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007; 
in press). For instance, participants reported less negative feelings in response to 
negative pictures when they subsequently tried to solve complex rather than simple 
math equations (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007).  
In recent years, the neurological effects of task load on processing of 
emotional stimuli have begun to receive more systematic research attention. Several 
studies have demonstrated that activity in emotion processing regions of the brain in 
response to negative emotional stimuli, such as the amygdalae, depend on the 
availability of attentional resources for processing of these stimuli (Erk, Klezcar, & 
Walter, 2007; Okon-Singer, Tzelgov & Henik, 2007; Mitchell et al., 2007; Pessoa et 
al., 2002; Van Reekum et al., 2007). For example, in one study, negative visual 
distracters engaged the amygdalae during participants’ judgements whether two 
bars were like oriented or not (Pessoa et al., 2002), but only when the difference in 
orientation of two bars was easy to judge. When the orientation of the two bars was 
difficult to judge, so that the central task became more attentionally demanding, the 
amygdalae no longer differentiated between the negative and neutral distracters. In 
another study (Erk, Klezcar, & Walter, 2007), amygdalae responses to negative 
scenes were smaller when participants concurrently performed a working memory 
task that was highly rather than moderately demanding. 
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Although past work has made important progress, it remains unclear 
precisely how task load influences the emotional brain. One possibility, which has 
been proposed in prior work, is that task load prevents the processing of the 
emotional impact of negative stimuli altogether. From this perspective, task load may 
cause an emotionally relevant stimulus to simply bypass emotional circuits. Given 
that most prior research relied on demanding distractor tasks that visually competed 
with emotional information (Erthal et al., 2005; Okon-Singer, Tzelgov & Henik, 2007; 
Pessoa et al., 2002), task load may have led participants to overlook some of the 
emotional information. Moreover some emotion regulation theorists have proposed 
that attentional deployment strategies (such as providing people with an additional 
task load) may allow people to manage unwanted emotions even before these 
emotions have been fully aroused (Gross, 2001). 
Another possibility, which is highlighted in the present work, is that task load 
is capable of down-regulating emotional circuits even after these circuits have been 
mobilized. This would imply that emotional brain regions operate quite flexibly, in 
that they can still be modulated by contextual demands after the initial emotional 
response has unfolded. Behavioral research indeed suggests that task load can still 
modulate emotional processing even after the initial emotional response has already 
been triggered (Gerin et al., 2006; Glynn, Christenfeld & Gerin, 2002; Van Dillen & 
Koole, 2007). For instance, in one study (Gerin et al., 2006), participants’ elevated 
blood pressure levels in response to an anger induction returned to baseline more 
quickly when they subsequently performed an engaging task rather than no task. 
Perhaps then, performing a demanding task may similarly down-regulate the 
unfolding of the emotional brain response. 
The present research was designed to investigate the neural dynamics by 
which task load modulates the emotional brain response, even after this response 
has already been initiated. In an experimental study, participants were exposed to 
neutral or negative emotional pictures, after which they performed an arithmetic task 
that made varying demands on processing resources (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001), and 
rated their emotional state (Fig.1). Throughout the experiment, participants’ brain 
responses were monitored using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We 
predicted that, relative to exposure to neutral pictures, exposure to negative pictures 
would activate both negative experiences and emotional brain circuits such as the 
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amygdalae and the insulae (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002). In addition, we 
predicted that task load would increase activation in brain regions implicated in 
cognitive processing, such as the dorsolateral frontal cortex and the superior parietal 
cortex (Duncan & Owen, 2000; Rypma, Prabhakaran, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 
1999).  
Most importantly, we hypothesized that task load would modulate 
subjectively reported emotional states and the activation of emotional brain circuits. 
That is, we predicted neural activity in regions implicated in emotional processing to 
decrease with increases in task load. Although the negative pictures should initiate a 
greater response in emotional brain areas than neutral pictures, we expected that 
the unfolding of this response over time would be attenuated when participants 
subsequently performed a highly demanding arithmetic task rather than a 
moderately demanding arithmetic task. In short, we predicted that task load would 
modulate the unfolding of the emotional brain response, even after this response 
was already initiated. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design  
 Seventeen volunteers at the VU University Amsterdam (13 women, average 
age 20) took part in the experiment. All participants were right-handed and native 
Dutch speakers. The participants did not report any history of neurological or 
psychiatric problems. The ethical review board of the VU Medical Centre approved 
of the study and all volunteers provided written informed consent (according to the 
Declaration of Helsinki) after the study procedure had been explained to them. They 
were paid €20 for participation. The experimental design was 2 (task load: high 
versus low) x 2 (picture valence: neutral versus negative), both factors within 
participants.  
 
Procedure and Equipment 
 Participants were invited to the lab to participate in a brain-imaging 
experiment. Before starting with the actual experiment, participants were instructed 
about the experimental set-up. Participants were then led to the scanner-room and 
positioned supine in the whole-body scanner, where they completed the actual 
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experiment. All stimuli were back-projected onto a screen and viewed by participants 
through an angled mirror. The experiment consisted of a picture viewing task that 
contained four blocks of 32 experimental trials (128 trials in total). The order of the 
blocks was counterbalanced between participants and trials within blocks were 
displayed in random order. Each trial consisted of a picture followed by an arithmetic 
task and a mood scale. The pictures were selected from the International Affective 
Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001). Based on published norms 
(ranging on a scale from 1 [most unpleasant] to 9 [most pleasant]), we selected two 
sets of 64 pictures, a negative set (valence ratings lower than 2.50) and a neutral set 
(valence ratings between 4.00 and 5.00). Negative pictures included images of 
scenes with burn victims, physical assaults, and angry faces. Neutral pictures 
depicted scenes of people in conversation, scenes of nature or buildings, and neutral 
faces.  
In each trial, a negative or neutral picture appeared on screen for 4 seconds. 
After picture presentation, participants had to perform an arithmetic task. The 
complexity of the task was randomly varied. In half of the trials, the arithmetic task 
consisted of a more complex equation such as ‘2*8 + 12 = 28’. These equations 
always combined a summation or subtraction with a product or division. In the 
remaining trials, the arithmetic task consisted of a much simpler equation, such as ‘7 
+ 2 = 9’. The latter equations only consisted of either a summation or a subtraction. 
Participants judged whether the equation was correct by pressing a button with 
either their left or right index finger. Participants had 4 seconds to make this 
response. For nine participants, the right button represented the correct response 
and the left button the incorrect response, while for eight participants this order was 
reversed.  
At the end of each trial, participants rated, with a button response, how 
unpleasant they felt at that moment (from 1 = not at all, to 8 = very much). For eight 
participants, this scale was reversed (ranging from right to left). In between trials, 
participants were asked to relax. To avoid systematic overlap of BOLD responses 
within and between trials, the interval between the arithmetic task and the mood 
scale, as well as the interval between the mood scale and the next trial, was set 
randomly to either 4,000 or 8,000 ms. The duration of each trial accordingly was 20, 
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24 or 28 seconds. The onset of each trial was synchronized to the onset of an fMRI 
volume. See Fig.1 for a schematic depiction of a trial. 
Prior to the presentation of the first block, participants were given a block of 
16 practice trials to get familiar with the experimental set-up and the scanner. After 
the experiment, participants were thanked for their efforts, debriefed, and paid by the 
experimenter.  
 
  
Figure 1. Schematic depiction of a trial. 
 
A personal computer controlled presentation of the experimental trials and 
recorded participants’ responses. The experimental trials were presented in E-prime 
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, USA). Participants responded by 
pressing fiber-optic buttons (Lumitouch Photon Control, Burnaby, Canada).  
 
MRI Procedure and Analysis 
 Brain imaging was performed on a 1.5 T Siemens Sonata scanner 
(Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a volume head coil. 
Functional volumes consisted of 24 near axial slices acquired using an EPI 
sequence with the following parameters: repetition time = 2 s, echo time = 50 ms, flip 
4 s 
4 s 
4/8 s 
4 s 
4 s 
4/8 s 
Time 
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angle = 90°, slice thickness = 4.2 mm, slice gap = 0.84 mm, acquisition matrix = 64 x 
64 pixels, in-plane resolution = 3 x 3 mm. Series of 392 volumes were acquired in 
each of the four blocks of trials. Images were on-line motion corrected. After the 
functional session, a three-dimensional structural scan was acquired using a T1-
weighted MP-RAGE sequence with the following scanning parameters: repetition 
time = 2730 ms, echo time = 3.43 ms, inversion time = 1000 ms, flip angle = 7°, 160 
sagittal slices, slice thickness = 1 mm, acquisition matrix = 256 x 224 pixels, in-plane 
resolution = 1 x 1 mm. 
Preprocessing and statistical analyses of the MRI data were performed 
using BrainVoyager 2000 software (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands). 
The first 2 volumes were discarded in order to avoid differences in T1 saturation. 
Voxel time-series of the remaining volumes were high-pass filtered (0.01 Hz), 
temporally smoothed (2.5 s FWHM Gaussian kernel), and corrected for slice 
acquisition times. Finally, volumes were 3D spatially smoothed (6 mm FWHM 
Gaussian kernel). Each functional run was manually co-registered to the individual 
3D structural scan, re-sampled, and transformed into Talairach space (Goebel et al., 
2001; Talairach & Tourpoux, 1988). A multirun/multisubject GLM design matrix was 
constructed to model the relevant brain responses for each run and participant 
(Friston, Holmes, Price, Buchel, & Worsley, 1999). The matrix consisted of 
regressors predicting hemodynamic responses to each combination of picture 
valence and working memory load. 
FMRI data were first analyzed at each voxel (whole brain) and then 
specifically for a number of regions of interest (ROI’s). Voxel time series were 
standardized and corrected for serial correlations. The random-effects whole-brain 
analysis served to identify brain regions that responded in any way to negative 
pictures in our task. ROI’s were defined on the basis of the whole-brain activation 
obtained in response to negative pictures that were followed either by a simple or a 
complex arithmetic task. The statistical threshold for this random-effects whole-brain 
analysis was p = .05 after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. 
Results 
Arithmetic performance  
 To investigate whether our manipulation of task was successful, we 
analyzed participants’ correct responses and response times. Analyses of variance 
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(ANOVA’s) revealed that participants performed better on simple arithmetic tasks 
than on complex arithmetic tasks (M = 97% correct, SD = 1.09 versus M = 84% 
correct, SD = 5.56; F (1, 16) = 161.59, p < .0001), irrespective of picture valence. 
Participants were also faster on simple than on complex arithmetic equations, F (1, 
16) = 858.38, p < .0001 (M = 1929, SD = 160 versus M = 3083, SD = 145). These 
effects confirm that the complex arithmetic equations were more difficult than the 
simple arithmetic equations.  
 
Self-reported negative emotion  
 To examine whether task load modulates participants’ self-reported negative 
emotion, we analyzed the effect of both working memory load (high, low) and picture 
valence (negative, neutral) on  their self-reports. As expected, this ANOVA yielded a 
significant effect of picture valence, F(1, 16) = 11.78, p = .003. On average, 
participants reported more negative emotion after trials with negative pictures than 
after trials with neutral pictures (respectively, M = 4.55, SD = 1.08 versus M = 3.15, 
SD = 1.14).  
The analysis further yielded the predicted interaction between task load and 
picture valence, F(1, 16) = 5.25, p = .036. To interpret this effect, we analyzed the 
effects of task load separately in each valence condition. In line with previous 
research using the same paradigm (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007), there was no effect 
of task load in the neutral trials, F < 1. By contrast, task load had a significant effect 
in the negative trials, F(1, 16) = 7.84, p = .013. Participants reported less negative 
emotion when negative pictures were followed by a complex arithmetic equation 
rather than a simple arithmetic equation (M = 4.40, SD = 1.07 versus M = 4.70, SD = 
1.10). Thus, in line with previous findings (Dan Dillen & Koole, 2007), task load 
modulated participants’ self-reported negative emotion. 
 
Brain regions involved in both emotion and task-related processes 
 To investigate whether task load modulated the unfolding of participants’ 
emotional brain responses, we first identified brain regions that responded to 
negative emotional pictures in our task. This yielded a number of areas, such as the 
bilateral amygdalae, the bilateral inferior insulae, the right dorsolateral frontal cortex 
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and the right superior parietal cortex. In Table 1 and Appendix A, the regions of 
interest (ROI’s) are given, with their xyz-coordinates and cluster sizes.  
 
Table 1. Brain areas responding to negative emotional pictures (p < .05, corrected) and 
showing a picture valence x task load interaction (p < .05). 
Talaraich 
coordinates (mm) 
Fint Brain region 
(Brodmann area, hemisphere) 
x y z 
Volume (ml) 
9-12 s 13-16 s 
Cognitive regions 
Dorsolateral frontal cortex (BA 
6/44, right) 
40 2 30 0.210 14.77** 50.95** 
Superior parietal cortex  
(BA 7, right) 
24 -59 53 0.331 9.06** 25.33** 
Dorsal occipital cortex (left) -22 -79 19 13.979 4.80 22.65** 
Dorsal occipital cortex (right) 23 -77 18 13.129 -- 17.01** 
Ventral occipital cortex (left) -22 -64 -5 30.286 -- 5.29 
Parahippocampal cortex (right) 34 -19 -16 0.643 -- 5.92 
Emotional regions 
Amygdala (left) -19 -5 -9 0.211 7.83 8.62** 
Amygdala (right) 22 -8 -10 0.450 7.02 6.17 
Inferior insula (right) 31 -3 -9 0.173 4.74 4.82 
Note. Fint = F-value of picture valence x task load interaction. -- = regions do not 
show an interaction between picture valence and task load in the corresponding time window. 
Degrees of freedom are 1 and 16, ** p <.01. 
 
Subsequently, for each region and participant, we computed the 
hemodynamic response to each picture/load combination by means of a 
deconvolution analysis, for the first 16 s following picture onset. Activation in 
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response to the neutral and negative pictures peaked at time = 6 s after picture 
onset (see Fig.2), which corresponds to the delay of the hemodynamic response. 
Moreover, analyses of variance revealed that, at this point, selected regions indeed 
responded more strongly to negative than to neutral pictures (all p < . 05, see 
Appendix A).  Initially, negative pictures thus engaged these brain regions to a 
greater degree than neutral pictures. 
 
 
Figure 2. (a) Two coronal views of the averaged brain (n =17) in Talairach space (y=2 and y=–
5 mm, resp.) on which areas are displayed that responded significantly to negative pictures (p 
< .05, corrected for multiple comparisons) and in which activity was either greater when 
working memory load was low compared to high (upper row; bilateral amygdalae [A] and right 
inferior insula [I]), or in which activity was greater when working memory load was high 
compared to low (lower row; right dorsolateral frontal cortex [Dlfc]). (b) Deconvolved averaged 
timecourses of the brain responses in the right amygdala and right dorsolateral frontal cortex 
for each trial type; negative (Neg) or neutral (Neu) pictures that were followed by either a high 
(Hi) or a low (Lo) working memory load task. Picture onset was at time = 0 s, task onset was 
at time = 4 s. 
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Because the task was introduced 4 s after picture onset, any effect of task 
load on the response to the picture would thus be expected at about 10 s and 
onwards. In line with this, activation in cognitive processing regions, such as the 
right dorsolateral frontal cortex, peaked at time = 10 s (see Fig.2). In order to assess 
the timing of the effects of our manipulations more precisely, the hemodynamic 
responses of the selected regions were broken into two time windows of two fMRI 
volumes each (9 – 12 s, and 13 – 16 s). These time windows were then further tested 
in subsequent analyses of variance for effects of picture valence and task load. The 
results of the analyses are given in Table 1.  
If task load indeed modulates the temporal unfolding of emotional responses 
in the brain, this would imply an interaction effect between picture valence and task 
load on participants’ brain activity. We indeed found significant statistical interactions 
between picture valence and task load in several regions during both the first (9 – 12 
s) and second (13 – 16 s) time window following task onset. During the first time 
window we found interaction effects in right dorsolateral frontal cortex (F(1, 16) = 
14.77, p = .001), right superior parietal cortex (F(1, 16) = 9.06, p = .008), the left 
dorsal occipital cortex (F (1,16) = 4.80, p = 0.044), the left amygdala (F (1,16) = 7.83, 
p = 0.01), the right amygdala (F(1, 16) = 7.02, p = .018), and the right inferior insula 
(F(1, 16) = 4.74, p = .045). During the second time window, we found significant 
statistical interactions between picture valence and task load in right dorsolateral 
frontal cortex (F(1, 16) = 50.95, p < 0.0001), right superior parietal cortex (F(1, 16) = 
25.33, p = .0001), left dorsal occipital cortex (F(1, 16) = 22.65, p = .002), right dorsal 
occipital cortex (F(1, 16) = 17.01, p = .001), left ventral occipital cortex (F(1, 16) = 
5.29, p = .035), right parahippocampal cortex (F(1, 16) = 5.92, p = .027), left 
amygdala (F(1, 16) = 8.62, p = .01), right amygdala (F(1, 16) = 6.17, p = .025) and 
right insula (F(1, 16) = 4.82, p = .043; see Table 1 for an overview). Because pair-
wise comparisons (see below) did not yield any significant effects for activity in right 
parahippocampal cortex, this region was therefore excluded from subsequent 
analyses. 
 
The effect of task load on brain responses to negative pictures  
Recall that we predicted a smaller neural response in emotion regions to 
negative pictures when followed by a complex task (high load), rather than a simple 
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task (low load) while we expected neural responses in cognitive processing regions 
to display the opposite pattern. To test these predictions, we directly compared the 
responses to negative pictures followed by either a complex or a simple arithmetic 
task in the regions that showed interactions between picture valence and task 
complexity. Note that these comparisons result in a positive t-value if the response is 
greater in the high load than the low load trials, and a negative t-value if the 
response is greater in the low load trials. 
During the first time window, the left amygdala (t(16) = –2.91, p = .010) and 
the right amygdala (t(16) = –1.97, p = .066) showed weaker responses to negative 
pictures followed by a complex task rather than a simple task. During the second 
time window, the left amygdala (t(16) = –4.29, p = .001), right amygdala (t(16) = –
5.11, p = .0001), and right insula (t(16) = –2.25, p = .039) showed weaker responses 
to negative pictures followed by a complex task rather than a simple task (see Table 
2, Figure 2). These regions are known to be involved in the processing of emotional 
stimuli (Ochsner et al., 2004; Phan et al., 2002). Thus, increased task load led to 
reduced activation in emotion circuits.  
During the first time window, right dorsolateral frontal cortex  (t(16) = 7.94, p 
< .0001), right superior parietal cortex (t(16) = 6.62, p < .0001), and left dorsal 
occipital cortex (t(16) = 5.01, p = .0001) showed greater activation to negative 
pictures followed by a complex task rather than a simple task. During the second 
time window, right dorsolateral frontal cortex (t(16) = 3.43, p = .003), right superior 
parietal cortex (t(16) = 2.43, p = .027), left dorsal occipital cortex (t(16) = 2.52, p = 
.023), and left ventral occipital cortex (t(16) = 1.97, p = .066) showed greater 
activation to negative pictures followed by a complex task rather than a simple task 
(see Table 2, Figure 2). These regions are known to be involved in cognitive 
processing and to respond to increasing task load (De Fockert et. al., 2001; Duncan 
& Owen, 2000; Rypma et. al., 1999). Thus, as expected, performing complex 
arithmetic sums engaged brain regions that support cognitive processes. 
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Table 2. Brain areas showing a picture valence x task load interaction (p < .05) and displaying 
an effect of task load on responses to negative pictures.  
Talaraich coordinates (mm) Tneg Brain region 
(Brodmann area, hemisphere) 
x y z 
 
9-12 s 13-16 s 
Cognitive regions 
Dorsolateral frontal cortex (BA 6/44, 
right) 
40 2 30  7.94** 3.43** 
Superior parietal cortex  
(BA 7, right) 
24 -59 53  6.62** 2.43* 
Dorsal occipital cortex (left) -22 -79 19  5.01** 2.52* 
Dorsal occipital cortex (right) 23 -77 18  -- 0.88 
Ventral occipital cortex (left) -22 -64 -5  -- 1.97† 
Emotional regions 
Amygdala (left) -19 -5 -9  –2.91* –4.29** 
Amygdala (right) 22 -8 -10  –1.97† –5.11** 
Inferior insula (right) 31 -3 -9  –1.11 –2.25* 
Note. Tneg = t-value of effect of task load after negative pictures; with positive t  meaning 
greater response to high than to low load, and negative t  meaning greater response to low 
than to high load. -- = regions that do not show an interaction between picture valence and 
task load in the corresponding time window. Degrees of freedom = 16, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p 
< .1 
 
The effect of picture valence on brain responses under low versus high load 
 Another way to look at the interaction effect between picture valence and 
task load is to investigate the effect of picture valence within each task load 
condition. If non-emotional information competes with emotional information for 
limited processing capacity, then performing a high load task, compared to a low 
load task, should attenuate brain activity in response to negative pictures towards 
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the level of activity induced by neutral pictures. In other words, the effect of picture 
valence should be greater under low, than under high task load conditions. 
 
Table 3. Brain areas showing a picture valence x task load interaction (p < .05) and displaying 
an effect of picture valence under low, but not under high task load in the first time window (9 – 
12 s). 
Talaraich coordinates 
(mm) 
Neg-Neu Brain region 
(Brodmann area, hemisphere) 
x y z 
 
Low 
Load 
High 
Load 
Cognitive regions 
Dorsolateral frontal cortex (BA 6/44, 
right) 
40 2 30  2.66* 0.89 
Emotional regions 
Amygdala (left) -19 -5 -9  3.56** 2.04† 
Amygdala (right) 22 -8 -10  4.00** 1.82† 
Inferior insula (right) 31 -3 -9  2.48* 1.89† 
Note. Neg-Neu = t-value of effect of picture valence; with positive t  meaning greater response 
to negative than to neutral pictures, and negative t  meaning greater response to neutral than 
to negative pictures. Degrees of freedom = 16, ** p <.01, * p <.05, † p <.1 
 
During the first time window, pairwise comparisons revealed an effect for 
picture valence on emotional brain responses only when participants performed a 
simple task. Thus, when task load was low, left amygdala (t(16) = 3.56, p = .003), 
right amygdala (t(16) = 4.00, p = .001), as well as right insula (t(16) = 2.48, p = .025) 
displayed a significantly greater response to negative than to neutral pictures. 
However, when task load was high, the difference between brain responses to 
negative and neutral pictures in left amygdala (t(16) = 2.04, p = .058), right amygdala 
(t(16) = 1.82, p = .084), and right insula (t(16) = 1.89, p = .088) was much smaller. 
During the second time window, responses to neutral and negative pictures no 
longer differed, independent of task load. For an overview of these results, see Table 
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3. Thus, in regions involved in emotion processing, high task load reduced brain 
activity in response to negative pictures to the level of activity induced by neutral 
pictures more rapidly than low task load.  
Interestingly, not only limbic regions showed greater activity in response to 
negative than to neutral pictures only when task load was low, right dorsolateral 
frontal cortex also revealed an effect of picture valence only when participants 
performed the simple arithmetic task; t(16) = 2.66, p = .017. When task load was 
high, responses to negative pictures no longer differed from responses to neutral 
pictures; t(16) = 0.89, ns.. However, contrary to activity in limbic regions, overall 
activity in right dorsolateral frontal cortex in response to neutral and negative 
pictures was greater in the high load than in the low load trials (see Figure 2, Table 
2). In line with our hypothesis, it thus seems that task load modulates the temporal 
unfolding of the emotional brain response. The more processing resources a person 
needs to perform a cognitive task, as evidenced by the increased recruitment of right 
dorsolateral cortex under high task load, the less will be left for emotional responses 
to proliferate. 
 
Interrelation of brain regions involved in emotion and task processing 
 We examined the interrelations of neural activity in the amygdalae and right 
insula on the one hand and the right dorsolateral frontal cortex on the other hand. To 
this end, we first computed an index of the amount of modulation of picture valence 
by working memory load. We did this by calculating the difference between 
responses to negative pictures followed by a simple task and neutral pictures 
followed by a simple task, minus the difference between responses to negative 
pictures followed by a complex task and neutral pictures followed by a complex task, 
separately for each participant, ROI, and fMRI time window. Note that because of 
the double subtraction, the sign of the working memory load effect is lost. We then 
correlated these indices of the modulation of the valence effect across participants 
between ROIs, separately for each time window. 
We found that activation in left amygdala correlated with activation in right 
dorsolateral frontal cortex (r = .52, p = .027) during the 9th - 12th second following 
picture onset. Moreover, activation in right inferior insula correlated with activation in 
right dorsolateral frontal cortex during the 9th - 12th second following picture onset 
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(although marginally significant; r = .43, p = .075) and the 13th - 16th second following 
picture onset (r = .47, p = .049). Whereas activation in right dorsolateral frontal 
cortex was greater in response to high compared to low working memory load, 
activation in limbic regions was smaller in response to high compared to low working 
memory load (see previous section, Table 2 and Fig.2). In line with predictions then, 
there was a systematic relationship between activity in regions implicated in 
emotional processing (amygdala, right insula) and activity in right dorsolateral frontal 
cortex, which is consistent with the idea that these systems operate in a coordinated 
manner (Pessoa, 2008).  
Discussion 
 The present research examined how task load modulates the unfolding of 
the emotional brain response. Importantly, in the present paradigm, the emotional 
stimulus and the task load were presented in succession. Thus, participants solved 
an arithmetic equation following each neutral or negative picture. This temporal 
separation made it possible to investigate the dynamic unfolding of the interplay 
between cognitive and emotional neural structures. Previous research has proposed 
that task load may ‘short-circuit’ emotional processing in the brain, such that activity 
in emotional brain regions is inhibited altogether. In the present research, however, 
we suggest that even when emotional circuits have already been engaged, 
performing a demanding task may still attenuate processing in the emotional brain. 
In support of our hypotheses, the present findings show that both cognitive 
regions (right dorsolateral frontal cortex) and emotion regions (bilateral amygdalae, 
right insula) showed greater activity in response to negative pictures than in 
response to neutral pictures when participants performed a mildly demanding task, 
whereas this was no longer the case when participants performed a highly 
demanding task. Consistent with previous work (Cohen et al., 1997; Prabhakaran et 
al., 2000), high task load further resulted in an increase in activity in cognitive 
regions (right dorsolateral frontal cortex, right superior parietal cortex, dorsal 
occipital cortex, left ventral occipital cortex). More importantly, task load also 
resulted in a decrease in brain regions involved in emotion processing (bilateral 
amygdalae, right insula). Finally, during task performance, activity in cognitive 
regions (right dorsolateral frontal cortex, left dorsal occipital cortex) was related to 
activity in emotion regions (bilateral amygdala, right insula). Together, these findings 
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suggest that emotional and cognitive circuits in the brain operate in a coordinated 
manner to deal with changing task demands.  
The present findings go beyond a simple reciprocal modulation of cognitive 
and emotion circuits in the brain, in that increases in activity in cognitive brain 
regions not necessarily resulted in decreases in activity in emotional brain regions. 
That is, during picture display, activity in both dorsolateral frontal cortex as well as 
limbic regions, i.e. the bilateral amygdalae and the insulae, was greater in response 
to negative pictures than to neutral pictures. Only when participants performed the 
arithmetic equations neural responses in cognitive and emotional regions began to 
differentiate. Whereas activity in the right dorsolateral frontal cortex increased even 
more, performing the arithmetic equations resulted in a decrease in neural activity in 
limbic regions. In line with previous findings (Erk, Klezcar, & Walter, 2007), right 
dorsolateral frontal cortex was thus “shared” by task-related and emotion-related 
processing. Accordingly, our results reveal an integration effect for processing 
negative emotion and task load in right dorsolateral frontal cortex.  
One potential explanation for these findings is that the right dorsolateral 
frontal cortex is engaged more with increasing task load, in order to sustain priority 
to processing of the central task at the cost of the further processing of emotionally 
salient, but task irrelevant negative stimuli (see Erk, Klezcar, & Walter, 2007, for a 
similar argument). Theorists have proposed that the lateral frontal/prefrontal cortex 
may function as a key neural substrate of the central bottleneck of information 
processing (Dux, Ivanoff, Asplund & Marois, 2006; Herath et al., 2001; Marois and 
Ivanoff, 2005). As such, the lateral frontal cortex may be critical for mental 
operations such as cognitive control, decision-making, and modality-independent 
selection of task-relevant information (Badre et al., 2005; Brass et al., 2005; Bunge 
et al., 2003). The present research findings suggest that the role of the lateral frontal 
cortex in controlling information processing may extend beyond the cognitive 
domain, and may similarly control processing of emotional information.  
Cognitive emotion regulation strategies may build upon more general 
information processing systems such as working memory and cognitive control that 
typically engage (frontal) cortical regions such as the dorsolateral frontal cortex 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2008). Indeed, a recent study revealed a role of the lateral frontal 
cortex in inhibiting emotional distraction in healthy adults during a working memory 
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task (Johnson et al., 2005; Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006). Performing a working 
memory task engaged the lateral frontal cortex to a greater degree when the 
participants were distracted by negative emotional pictures rather than neutral or 
scrambled pictures. Moreover, participants who displayed greater activity to 
emotional distracters in the lateral frontal cortex judged emotional distracters as less 
distracting and less emotional.  
The present research findings potentially have important implications for 
psychopathologies that are characterized by both emotional and cognitive deficits, 
like depression and anxiety (Harvey et al., 2005; Luu, Tucker, & Derryberry, 1998; 
Mayberg et al., 1999). Emotional stimuli can have a lasting effect on amygdala 
activity (Cuthbert et al., 2000), specifically in depressed individuals (Siegle et al., 
2002). Moreover, research has shown that people are inclined to ponder over a 
negative experience, which may subsequently intensify and prolong people’s 
negative emotional states (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow & Frederickson, 1993). 
Placing people in a quiet environment in order to let them ‘cool down’ from an 
emotional response may therefore not necessarily result in a more neutral mind 
state. Although more research is needed in this area, it is conceivable that 
cognitively demanding tasks may eventually be used as a therapeutic tool. Having 
people perform an engaging task may alleviate the intensity of acute emotional 
responses, such that people become more receptive to long-term therapeutic 
interventions.  
More broadly speaking, the present work attests to the close coordination 
between cognitive and emotional functioning. In line with previous research, our 
findings demonstrated that further engagement of cognitive circuits result in a 
decrease in activity in emotional circuits (Drevets & Raichle, 1998; Keightley et al., 
2003; Mayberg et al., 1999), especially when processing load of a central task is 
high. Depending on the threats and challenges that people face, cognitive and 
emotional systems are recruited in a flexible manner, such that people can deal 
effectively with the ever changing demands of their environment.  
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Appendix A.  
All statistical regions of interest (ROIs). Brain areas responding to negative emotional 
pictures (p < .05, corrected) and showing a greater response to negative than to neutral 
pictures at picture onset (t = 7 - 8 s.). 
 
Talaraich coordinates 
(mm) Brain region 
(Brodmann area, hemisphere) 
x y z 
Volume 
(ml) 
Fv 
Cognitive regions 
Dorsolateral frontal cortex (BA 6/44, 
right) 
40 2 30 0.210 61.56**      
Superior parietal cortex  
(BA 7, right) 
24 -59 53 0.331 13.63**      
Fasciculus uncinatus (BA 34, left) -28 7 -11 0.353 43.23** 
Dorsal occipital cortex (left) -22 -79 19 13.979 12.13** 
Dorsal occipital cortex (right) 23 -77 18 13.129 8.63* 
Ventral occipital cortex (left) -22 -64 -5 30.286 6.47*      
Parahippocampal cortex (left) -30 -25 -14 0.763 0.15 
Parahippocampal cortex (right) 34 -19 -16 0.643 0.34 
Medial anterior temporal cortex (BA 
38, right) 
34 -4 -23 0.221 8.53*     
      
 
Note. F = Fvalue of picture valence, all negative > neutral. Degrees of freedom are 1 and 
16, * p <.05, ** p <.01. 
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Appendix A.  
All statistical regions of interest (ROIs). Brain areas responding to negative emotional 
pictures (p < .05, corrected) and showing a greater response to negative than to neutral 
pictures at picture onset (t = 7 - 8 s.). 
 
Talaraich coordinates (mm) 
Brain region 
(Brodmann area, hemisphere) 
x y z 
Volume (ml) Fv 
Emotional regions 
Amygdala (left) -19 -5 -9 0.211 51.89** 
Amygdala (right) 22 -8 -10 0.450 5.32*      
Inferior insula (left) -31 -1 -9 465 10.94**      
Inferior insula (right) 31 -3 -9 0.173 5.32*      
Pulvinar (left) -18 -24 0 0.118 25.89**     
Pulvinar (right) 19 -24 0 0.986 8.31*      
Subcortical regions 
Locus ceruleus 0 -30 -28 0.244 2.60 
Superior colliculus (left) -6 -24 0 0.934 77.66** 
Superior colliculus (right) 6 -24 0 0.800 57.21**      
 
Note. F = Fvalue of picture valence, all negative > neutral. Degrees of freedom are 1 and 
16, * p <.05, ** p <.01. 
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Negative information draws attention more readily than positive or neutral 
information (Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Pratto & John, 1991). Regardless of 
whether it is a snake in the grass, an angry face in a crowd, or a fly in the 
ointment; negative stimuli have the power to disrupt people’s ongoing activities 
and to make them wonder what is going on. Apparently, the human mind is 
configured such that people instantly notice potential dangers in their 
environment (Öhman, 2007).  
The attention-grabbing power of negative information has recently 
become the focus of experimental research. In one pioneering series of studies, 
people were slower to name ink color of negative words than of positive or neutral 
words (Pratto & John, 1991). This attention-grabbing effect of negative 
information has been replicated numerous times, across different tasks and 
different types of stimuli (Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2003; Öhman, Flykt, & 
Esteves, 2001; Smith, Cacioppo, Larsen, & Chartrand, 2003). To account for 
these findings, theorists have proposed that detecting threats was vital to the 
survival of our pre-human ancestors. Natural evolution may thus have equipped 
people with an automatic vigilance mechanism (Pratto & John, 1991), that rapidly 
and unintentionally screens the environment for potential dangers (Dijksterhuis & 
Aarts, 2003). This vigilance for negative information may thus be part of the 
innate functional architecture of the human brain (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; 
Öhman, 2007).  
Attending to negative information is fast and unintentional. But is it truly 
unavoidable? Perhaps not. The type of stimulus-driven perceptual processing 
that underlies interference of negative information is known as bottom-up 
attentional control  
(Yantis, 2000). Recent theories of human cognition suggest that attention is not 
always under the influence of bottom-up processes. Indeed, attention can also be 
directed by top-down processes that control attention in accord with people’s 
current plans and behaviors (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Although the balance 
between top-down and bottom-up processes may vary, most tasks involve a 
combination of both influences. Thus, the question arises whether attention to 
negative information may be guided by top-down processes. 
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If top-down processes guide attention to negative information, then 
changes in the processing demands of a central task can be expected to 
modulate attentional interference of negative information. Consistent with this, 
recent research has demonstrated that task load moderates attentional 
interference of negative visual distracters (Erthal et al., 2005; Okon-Singer, 
Tzelgov & Henik, 2007; Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez & Ungerleider, 2002). For 
example, in one study (Erthal et al., 2005), negative visual distracters slowed 
down participants’ judgements whether two bars were like oriented or not, but 
only when the difference in orientation of two bars was substantial. When the 
orientation of the two bars differed only slightly, such that the central task became 
more demanding, negative visual distracters no longer interfered with the visual 
judgement task. In a neuro-imaging study using a similar paradigm, brain regions 
responding differentially to emotional faces, did so only when task load was low 
(Pessoa et al., 2002).  
Although increased task load may reduce attention to negative 
information, the precise mechanism that underlies this effect is unclear. In the 
present work, we suggest that attention to negative information is controlled by 
working memory processes. Working memory is an assembly of mental 
structures and processes that are used for temporarily storing and manipulating 
information (Baddeley, 1986). Unitary store models of working memory 
(Barrouillet et al., 2007; Conway & Engle, 1994) have proposed that because 
working memory capacity is limited, different types of information compete over 
its resources. Under high processing load, working memory facilitates attention to 
task-relevant information at the expense of task-irrelevant information (Knudsen, 
2007; Lavie & De Fockert, 2005). As such, working memory can override more 
unintentional, stimulus-driven responses. Therefore, it is conceivable that 
attention to salient, but task-irrelevant negative information is similarly subject to 
top-down control by working memory processes.  
In recent years, the idea that working memory is involved in processing 
negative information has received growing support. Specifically, studies have 
shown that loading working memory can reduce the emotional impact of negative 
stimuli (Erber & Tesser, 1992; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). For instance, negative 
stimuli induce less negative feelings when these pictures are followed by a task 
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that makes high rather than low demands on working memory (Van Dillen & 
Koole, 2007). Likewise, negative stimuli lead to smaller neural responses in the 
amygdalae, an important circuit in the emotional brain, when people perform a 
demanding working memory task (Erk, Kleczar, & Walter, 2007; Van Dillen, 
Heslenfeld, & Koole, 2008). Findings of this sort suggest that working memory 
plays a major role in dealing with negative information.  
A working memory account can easily accommodate past findings that 
task load can reduce interference of negative information (e.g. Erthal et al., 
2005). Specifically, when task load is high, working memory may facilitate 
attention to task-related information at the cost of task-irrelevant information. 
However, a working memory account also goes beyond prior work in several 
ways. First, prior work has typically investigated the competition over attentional 
resources between task-related and emotion-related information in the visual 
field. Yet, an important function of working memory is to maintain task-related 
information even when the task itself is not visually present, for example, during 
mental rehearsal (Knudsen, 2007). Thus, working memory may still modulate 
attention to negative information when task load is mentally rather than visually 
represented. Second, working memory not only controls the direction of attention 
to objects in the visual field. Indeed, working memory may also control attention 
to certain features of an object (Liu, Slotnick, Serences & Yantis, 2003). Under 
high working memory load, task-relevant features will thus receive more attention 
than task-irrelevant features. If working memory processes are involved, then 
loading working memory capacity may disrupt attentional interference of task-
irrelevant negative features, even when the object itself is in the focus of visual 
attention. 
We designed the present research to investigate the above predictions 
about the role of working memory resources in the interference of negative 
information. We conducted two studies using a modified emotional Stroop task. In 
this task, participants judged the gender of a series of angry and happy faces. 
Because emotional expressions are irrelevant to gender naming, longer response 
latencies to negative compared to positive faces indexed greater attentional 
interference of negative stimulus features (Pratto & John, 1991). In Study 1, we 
manipulated working memory load by varying the presentation of a math 
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equation. In Study 2, we manipulated working memory load by varying the digit-
span of numbers that participants had to retain (Sternberg, 1966). in both studies, 
working memory load was induced prior to the gender-naming task, such that 
there was no competition between task-related and emotional objects in the 
visual field. 
Overall, working memory load was expected to induce a general slow-
down in response times (Barrouillet, 2007). More importantly, however, we 
expected that working memory load would moderate attentional vigilance for 
negative information during the gender-naming task. Under low working memory 
load, we predicted that participants would display vigilance for negative but task-
irrelevant stimulus features (cf. Pratto & John, 1991), such that they would 
respond more slowly to angry faces than to happy faces. By contrast, we 
predicted that vigilance for negative stimulus features would be eliminated under 
high working memory load, such that participants would respond equally fast to 
angry and happy faces.  
Study 1 
 
Method 
Participants and Design  
Forty-one paid volunteers at the VU University Amsterdam (30 women, 
11 men, average age 21) took part in the experiment. The experimental design 
was 2 (math task: no task versus math task; within participants) x 2 (target 
expression: positive versus negative; within participants). The main dependent 
variables consisted of participants' math performance (both correct responses 
and response times) and their response times to the gender decision task.  
 
Procedure and Equipment 
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were led to individual cubicles 
with a personal computer. The experimenter explained that all instructions would 
be administered via a computer-program and left. After a brief introduction, 
participants proceeded with a gender-naming task in which participants had to 
indicate the gender of pictures of either male or female faces displaying either a 
happy or an angry expression. The faces were drawn from the The Karolinska 
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Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF) database (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). 
We selected pictures of fourteen individuals (seven men and seven women) 
facing directly into the camera and displaying either a happy or angry expression. 
Accordingly, the total set consisted of twenty-eight pictures. Each of the pictures 
was displayed twice; once without a math task, and once accompanied by a math 
task. Trials with and without a math task were presented in a random order. 
The gender-naming task consisted of 56 trials. Each trial was announced 
by a row of four asterisks (****) which remained in the center of the screen for one 
second. Before the 56 experimental trials, participants first received four practice 
trials to become familiar with the task. During each trial, a picture of either an 
angry or a happy male or female face appeared on screen for 2 seconds. 
Participants had to decide as quickly as possible, by making a keyboard 
response, whether the face on the screen was male or female. In half of the trials 
(28 trials), the gender-naming task was combined with a math task, which places 
considerable demands on working memory (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001). The math 
task consisted of a moderately complex equation, such as ‘4 * 8 + 11 = ?’. Each 
equation combined a summation or subtraction with a product or a division and 
was presented on screen for five seconds. In the other half of the trials, 
participants were presented with a blank screen for the duration of the math 
equation. In these trials, participants thus only performed the gender-naming 
task. Trials containing either a math task or no task were presented in a random 
order.  
Subsequently, a picture of a face was presented, and participants 
performed the gender-naming task. Following the gender-naming task, the 
answer of the math-equation appeared on screen, such as ‘43’, and participants 
had two seconds to judge whether it was correct by making a keyboard response. 
In one half of the trials, this was the correct answer, in the remaining half, the 
answer was incorrect. Incorrect answers deviated only slightly from correct 
answers, such that participants could not rely on making rough estimates.  
Participants’ responses and response times to the gender-naming task 
and the math task were unobtrusively recorded by the computer. At the end of the 
experimental trials, participants were thanked for their efforts, debriefed, and paid 
by the experimenter 
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Results 
Math performance  
Participants solved 89% (SD = 17) of the math equations correctly and 
had an average response time of 1,269 ms (SD = 281). A one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) yielded no effect of target expression on correct responses; 
F(1, 40) = 1.25, ns., or on response times to the math task, F(1, 40) < 1, ns. 
Accordingly, negative expressions did not interfere with math performance. 
 
Gender-naming task  
Incorrect responses to the gender-naming task represented only 4% of 
the trials, such that separate analyses of these responses would not be 
informative. We excluded the incorrect responses from subsequent analyses. 
To analyze participants’ performance on the gender-naming task, we 
conducted a 2 (target expression) x 2 (math task) ANOVA of participants’ 
response times. This analysis revealed a main effect of math task, F(1, 40) = 
6.53, p < .05. Participants responded more slowly to faces when a concurrent 
math task was present (M = 923, SD = 144) rather than absent (M = 891, SD = 
136). More importantly, the analysis yielded an interaction effect of math task and 
target expression, F(1, 40) = 4.74, p < .05. 
More focused comparisons yielded a main effect of target expression 
only in the trials without a math task; F(1, 40) = 5.59, p < .05. In these trials, 
participants responded more slowly when the expression was angry (M = 912, 
SD = 150) rather than happy (M = 869, SD = 121). In the trials with a math task, 
we found no effects of target expression, F < 1. In these trials, participants 
responded equally quickly to angry and happy faces (M = 927, SD = 140 and M = 
918, SD = 148, respectively).  
Removing the trials with an incorrect response to the math task from the analyses 
did not alter any of the above-described effects on gender naming. 
 
Discussion 
As expected, performing a math task eliminated the greater attentional 
interference of angry relative to happy faces in a gender-naming task. 
Importantly, the math task had this effect even though the task was not visually 
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present during gender naming and even though the emotional expression of the 
stimuli was in the focus of the visual field. The results of Study 1 thus provide the 
strongest evidence to date that  
working memory load moderates attentional interference of negative information. 
Notably, high working memory load also resulted in a general slow-down of 
responses to the gender-naming task. This slow-down was likely due to the 
increased attentional demands of the high load task (Barrouillet, 2007).  
 
Study 2 
We designed Study 2 to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1. 
Rather than manipulating the presence or absence of a working memory load, 
Study 2 varied the level of working memory load. To this end, participants 
retained either a one-digit number or an eight-digit number during the gender-
naming task. Varying digit span is a well established way to manipulate working 
memory load (Sternberg, 1966). If the effects of performing a math task in Study 
1 were due to their differential demands on working memory capacity, as our 
analysis suggests, then attentional interference of negative information should be 
greater while retaining one-digit rather than eight-digit numbers. On the other 
hand, if the results of Study 1 were simply due to the presence of an additional 
task, then retaining one-digit and eight-digit numbers should both suppress 
attentional interference of negative information. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design  
Thirty-six paid volunteers at the VU University Amsterdam (20 women, 16 
men, average age 21) took part in the experiment. The experimental design was 
2 (digit span: one-digit versus eight-digit; within participants) x 2 (target 
expression: positive versus negative; within participants). The main dependent 
variable consisted of participants' response times to the gender-naming task.  
 
Procedure and Equipment 
The experimental design was similar to that of Study 1. Participants again 
performed the gender-naming task consisting of 56 trials. This time, participants 
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were presented with a number at the beginning of each trial, which they had to 
retain during the gender-naming task. We varied the working memory load of the 
number task by manipulating the digit span of the number. In half of the trials (28 
trials), this was a one-digit number between zero and ten, such as ‘9’. In the 
remaining 28 trials, this was an eight-digit number, such as ‘25371906’. Trials 
containing a one-digit or an eight-digit number were presented in a random order.  
In each trial, following the gender-naming task, a number again appeared 
on screen and participants had to judge whether it was the same number as they 
had retained during the gender decision task. In half of the trials, this was the 
same number as they had seen previously, whereas in the remaining half this 
was a different number. In the trials in which participants retained an eight-digit 
number one of the eight digits could vary, such that participants had to retain all 
eight digits in order to perform the number-task effectively. 
 
Results 
Digit span performance  
A 2 (digit span) x 2 (target expression) ANOVA yielded a main effect for 
digit span on participants’ correct responses; F(1, 35) = 110.93, p < .001 and on 
participants’ response times; F(1, 35) = 806.00, p < .001. Participants gave more 
correct responses to the one-digit numbers (M = 94%, SD = 10) than to the eight-
digit numbers (M = 77%, SD = 11) and participants responded faster to the one-
digit numbers (M = 1126, SD = 216) than to the eight-digit numbers (M = 2095,  
SD = 290). As in Study 1, there were no effects for target expression on either 
correct responses, F(1, 35) < 1, ns, or response times, F(1, 35) < 1, ns. 
 
Gender-naming task  
To analyze participants’ performance on the gender-naming task, we 
conducted a 2 (digit span) x 2 (target expression) ANOVA of participants’ 
response times. As in Study 1, incorrect responses (4% of all responses) were 
excluded from the data. The analysis yielded a main effect of digit span, F(1, 35) 
= 5.66, p < .05. Participants were slower to respond to the faces when they had 
to retain an eight-digit number (M = 937, SD = 131) than when they had to retain 
a one-digit number (M = 874, SD = 157). More importantly, the analysis yielded 
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the predicted interaction of digit span and target expression, F(1, 35) = 4.38, p < 
.05.  
Focused comparisons only revealed a significant effect of target 
expression in the one-digit trials, F(1, 35) = 4.05, p < .05. When participants 
retained a one-digit number, that is, when working memory load was low, 
participants responded slower to angry faces (M = 892, SD = 161) than to happy 
faces (M = 855, SD = 152). When participants retained an eight-digit number, that 
is, when working memory load was high, participants responded equally fast to 
angry faces (M = 946, SD = 140) and happy faces (M = 927, SD = 122), F(1, 35) 
= 1.79, ns.  
As in Study 1, removing the trials with an incorrect response to the digit 
span task from the analyses did not alter any of the above-described effects on 
gender naming. 
 
Discussion 
The results of Study 2 thus confirmed that working memory load 
moderates the greater attentional interference of negative relative to positive 
information. Moreover, Study 2 demonstrates that attentional interference is not 
merely determined by the absence or presence of a concurrent task but rather by 
the degree to which working memory is taxed. 
 
General Discussion 
Negative information has the power to grab people’s attention readily and 
involuntarily (Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2003; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; 
Pratto & John, 1991). However, this power is not without limitations. Specifically, 
the present research hypothesized that top-down processes that are involved in 
working memory may modulate preferential allocation of attention to negative 
emotional information. When working memory load is low, top-down control of 
attention is relatively weak, and negative information may capture attention even 
when it is irrelevant to the focal task. By contrast, when working memory load is 
high, top-down control of attention is strengthened, so that task-irrelevant 
negative information may no longer assume priority in attention. This reasoning 
was confirmed in two experiments, which demonstrated that working memory 
How automatic is “automatic vigilance”? 
 83 
load can eliminate the greater attentional interference of negative relative to 
positive information.  
The present findings provide the most direct demonstration to date that 
working memory resources regulate attention to negative information. Prior work 
has documented how visual distracters can reduce attentional interference of 
negative information (Erthal et al., 2005; Pessoa et al., 2002). The present work 
goes beyond these findings, by showing that even non-visual, purely mental 
forms of task load can reduce attentional interference of negative information, 
presumably because such task load taxes working memory. Moreover, task load 
can moderate interference of negative stimulus features, even when the stimulus 
is in the focus of visual attention. An important implication of these findings is that 
working memory exerts a much more pervasive influence on attention to negative 
information than was previously assumed.  
At a more general level, the present research contributes to the 
theoretical integration between the literatures on working memory and emotion. 
Whereas traditional conceptions portrayed working memory as a "cold" cognitive 
system, a growing amount of evidence highlights the relevance of working 
memory for "hot" emotional processing (Erk et al., 2007; Van Dillen & Koole, 
2007). The present work adds to these findings by proposing a key role for 
working memory resources in determining whether "hot" information about 
potential threats in the environment gets prioritized over "cool" information that is 
relevant to people's ongoing cognitive tasks. As such, working memory functions 
seem vital to understanding the interface between cognition and emotion. 
Our findings that attention to negative information depends on working 
memory resources could be considered surprising, given that the attention-
grabbing power of negative information is widely assumed to be automatic (e.g. 
Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Pratto & John, 1991). However, these previous 
accounts can be reconciled with the present findings. Under conditions of low 
working memory load, negative information was found to interfere with ongoing 
attentional processing. The present findings thus confirm that automatic 
processes play an important role in quickly guiding attention towards negative 
information. However, as the present findings also show, negative information 
may cease to receive preferential attention when working memory is more fully 
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engaged by a focal task. Attention to negative information is thus fast and 
unintentional, but contingent upon the availability of sufficient working memory 
capacity. Consequently, attention to negative information appears to be driven by 
a combination of top-down and bottom-up control processes.  
The relative importance of top-down and bottom-up processes in 
attending to negative information may vary between different persons and 
situations. As the present findings indicate, conditions such as greater working 
memory load may increase the contribution of top-down attentional control. Other 
conditions, such as a higher intensity of negative information, may result in a 
greater contribution of bottom-up processes (Yantis, 2000), and accordingly 
result in a stronger negativity bias. In line with this, attentional interference of 
negative information is stronger for intensely negative stimuli than for mildly 
negative stimuli (Schimmack, 2005). A reduced capacity for top-down control 
may similarly result in a more pronounced negativity bias (see Eysenck et al., 
2007; Williams et al., 1996). Future research is needed to gain more insight into 
the dynamic interplay between bottom-up versus top-down processes in attention 
to negative information.  
So far, we have interpreted response time differences between positive 
and negative emotional stimuli as an index of interference of negative information 
(as is conventional, see Smith et al., 2006). Because this is a relative index, it 
remains possible that the effects of working memory load have been driven by an 
increase in attention to positive information. Nevertheless, we prefer to interpret 
our findings in terms of changes in attention to negative information. First, 
research that incorporated neutral control conditions has similarly shown load-
induced reductions in attentional interference of negative information (Erthal et 
al., 2005; Okon-singer, 2007). Second, neuro-imaging work indicates that 
increased working memory load decreases, rather than increases, neural 
responsiveness to positive emotional stimuli (Erk, Klezcar & Walter, 2007). The 
broader literature thus supports our interpretation that working memory load 
reduces interference of negative information rather than boosting interference of 
positive information.  
The present findings mesh well with recent neuropsychological evidence 
for a role of corticofrontal working memory areas in attentional control of 
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processing of negative emotional stimuli (Blair et al., 2007; Hariri, Bookheimer, & 
Mazziotta, 2000). For example, using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI), a recent study found that high working memory load compared to low 
working memory load resulted in decreased responsivity to negative stimuli in the 
bilateral amygdalae (Van Dillen et al., 2008). The amygdalae enhance perception 
of emotionally salient events (Anderson & Phelps, 2001) and may as such 
facilitate bottom-up control of attention. In accord with the present findings, 
bottom-up facilitation of attention to negative information in the brain can be 
modulated by taxing working memory.  
 At a more general level, the present research attests to a considerable 
amount of flexibility in human information processing. Evolutionary forces from a 
distant past may have shaped the mind to prioritize negative over other types of 
information. Nevertheless, this prioritization seems open to reprogramming in the 
present, by people’s current goals and interests. Perhaps it is this capacity to 
flexibly reprioritize information that allows people to move beyond the perception 
of imminent risks and dangers to explore the promises and opportunities that the 
future may hold. 
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Samenvatting 
 
 
Omgaan met negatieve gevoelens: De rol van het 
werkgeheugen in emotieregulatie. 
 
 
 
Hoewel negatieve gevoelens vaak hun nut hebben, kunnen ze ook 
ongewild iemands gedachten in beslag nemen en zodoende zijn of haar 
psychisch en fysiek welbevinden ondermijnen. Het is daarom belangrijk om na te 
gaan of er manieren bestaan waarop mensen zich kunnen beschermen tegen de 
verstorende werking van negatieve gevoelens. De hardnekkigheid van negatieve 
gevoelens is in ieder geval gedeeltelijk verklaarbaar door de onevenredige 
invloed die negatieve informatie heeft op het menselijke aandachtssysteem. Een 
bruikbare manier om negatieve gevoelens te reguleren is daarom wellicht om de 
hoeveelheid aandacht die aan negatieve informatie besteed wordt te controleren.  
De huidige dissertatie veronderstelt dat het werkgeheugen een centrale 
rol speelt in het reguleren van de aandacht voor negatieve informatie. Het 
werkgeheugen is een systeem waarin informatie tijdelijk opgeslagen en bewerkt 
kan worden. Het speelt een belangrijke rol in informatieverwerkingsprocessen, 
zoals probleem oplossen, plannen en communiceren. Omdat het werkgeheugen 
een beperkte capaciteit heeft, betekent dit dat mensen geen ongelimiteerde 
hoeveelheid informatie tegelijk kunnen vasthouden. De huidige dissertatie 
onderzoekt hoe de verwerking van negatieve informatie beïnvloed wordt door 
deze beperking van de werkgeheugencapaciteit. Hoofdstuk 1 geeft een 
theoretisch overzicht van de literatuur terwijl hoofdstuk 2 tot 4 empirisch 
onderzoek beslaan naar de rol van het werkgeheugen in het omgaan met 
negatieve informatie. 
Hoofdstuk 1 introduceert de belangrijkste theoretische begrippen, 
bestaande uit aandacht, het werkgeheugen, negatieve emotie, en hun onderlinge 
samenhang. Het hoofdstuk geeft een overzicht van alle empirische bevindingen 
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met betrekking tot de rol van het werkgeheugen in het omgaan met negatieve 
gevoelens. In het hoofdstuk wordt een werkgeheugen model van afleiding van 
negatieve gevoelens geïntroduceerd (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007) waarin de 
theoretische verbanden tussen deze concepten zijn georganiseerd. Het centrale 
idee van dit model is dat afleiding het gebruik van beperkte 
werkgeheugencapaciteit behelst. Hoe meer werkgeheugen wordt benut voor een 
afleidende activiteit, hoe minder ruimte over blijft voor het voortduren van  een 
emotionele reactie. In het vervolg van Hoofdstuk 1 wordt besproken in hoeverre 
het werkgeheugen model steun heeft van empirische bevindingen, waaronder het 
onderzoek waarvan verslag wordt gedaan in Hoofdstuk 2 tot 4. Tenslotte worden 
de beperkingen en implicaties van het model besproken, als wel mogelijkheden 
voor toekomstig onderzoek.  
Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft drie experimenten waarin onderzocht werd hoe 
werkgeheugenbelasting negatieve stemming kan afzwakken. Deelnemers werd 
neutrale, zwak negatieve, en sterk negatieve afbeeldingen getoond, waarna zij 
een taak uitvoerden en vervolgens aangaven hoe onprettig ze zich voelden op 
dat moment. Werkgeheugenbelasting werd gemanipuleerd door de aanwezigheid 
van de taak (Studie 1), taakcomplexiteit (Studie 2), of taakvoorspelbaarheid 
(Studie 3) te variëren. Deelnemers in alle drie de experimenten rapporteerden 
minder negatieve stemming in reactie op negatieve afbeeldingen als zij 
vervolgens een hoog belastende taak uitvoerden dan wanneer zij een laag 
belastende taak, of geen taak uitvoerden. Werkgeheugenbelasting had geen 
effect op de gerapporteerde stemming in reactie op neutrale afbeeldingen. 
Wanneer werkgeheugenbelasting hoog was, rapporteerden deelnemers niet 
langer meer negatieve stemming in reactie op sterk negatieve afbeeldingen dan 
in reactie op zwak negatieve afbeeldingen. Deze bevindingen suggereren dat het 
belasten van het werkgeheugen de emotionele verwerking tegengaat, en 
zodoende afleiding van negatieve stemming bevordert.  
Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft een experimentele studie waarin gekeken werd of 
werkgeheugenbelasting niet alleen zelf gerapporteerde stemming afzwakt, maar 
ook emotionele verwerking in het brein. Met behulp van functionele magnetische 
resonantie technieken (functional magnetic resonance imaging; fMRI) werd 
aangetoond dat taakbelasting tot een toename in neurale activteit leidde in 
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werkgeheugengebieden (rechter dorsolaterale frontale cortex, rechter superiere 
parietale cortex), maar tot een afname in neurale activiteit in gebieden die 
reageerden op negatieve emotionele afbeeldingen (de bilaterale amygdalae en 
de rechter anterieure insula). In overeenstemming met de bevindingen van 
Hoofdstuk 2, resulteerde een hoge werkgeheugenbelasting opnieuw in een 
reductie in zelf gerapporteerde negatieve stemming in reactie op negatieve 
afbeeldingen. Samen ondersteunen deze bevindingen een model waarin 
emotionele en niet-emotionele informatie concurreren om beperkte 
werkgeheugencapaciteit.  
Hoofdstuk 4 rapporteert twee experimenten die het effect onderzochten 
van werkgeheugenbelasting op onwilleurige aandacht voor negatieve informatie. 
Hoewel eerder werk veronderstelt dat aandacht voor negatieve informatie 
automatisch en onvermijdelijk is (Pratto & John, 1991), wordt in Hoofdstuk 4 de 
hypothese getoetst dat aandacht voor negatieve informatie afhangt van de 
beschikbaarheid van werkgeheugencapaciteit. In twee experimenten benoemden 
deelnemers de sekse van boze versus blije gezichten. Werkgeheugenbelasting 
werd gemanipuleerd door de aan- of afwezigheid van een rekentaak (Studie 1), 
of het onthouden van een één versus acht cijfes (Studie 2). Uit de resultaten 
bleek dat boze gezichten meer interfereerden met het benoemen van de sekse 
van de gezichten dan blije gezichten, maar alleen wanneer 
werkgeheugenbelasting laag was. De interferentie van negatieve informatie op 
aandacht wordt dus mede bepaald door de werkgeheugenbelasting van een 
additionele taak.   
Samengevat veronderstelt de huidige dissertatie dat het werkgeheugen 
een essentiële rol speelt in het omgaan met negatieve emotie. 
Werkgeheugenbelasting bleek de invloed van negatieve afbeeldingen op 
stemming af te zwakken (Hoofdtuk 2 en 3), alsmede emotionele responsen in het 
brein (Hoofdstuk 3). Bovendien onderdrukte werkgeheugenbelasting de 
interferentie van negatieve informatie op aandacht (Hoofdstuk 4). Ondanks de 
soms overweldigende indruk van negatieve informatie, blijken mensen in staat te 
zijn om hun negatieve emotionele reacties te reguleren door zich te richten op de 
taken en doelen die hen op dat moment bezig houden.  
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Summary  
 
 
Dealing with negative feelings: The role of working memory 
in emotion regulation. 
 
 
 
Though negative emotions are often adaptive, they can occupy people’s 
thoughts unwantedly and thereby undermine psychological and physical well-
being. It is therefore important to look for ways in which people can shield 
themselves against the disruptive power of negative emotion. The pervasiveness 
of negative emotions is partly due to the strong impact of negative information on 
the human attention system. Consequently, one potentially effective way to deal 
with negative emotions may be to control the amount of attention that is to 
negative information. The present dissertation examines how processing of 
negative emotional information is influenced by the availability of working 
memory resources. Chapter 1 provides a theoretical overview and Chapters 2 to 
4 report empirical tests of the role of working memory in dealing with negatively 
charged information.  
Chapter 1 introduces the key concepts of the present dissertation, which 
consist of attention, working memory, negative emotion, and their interplay, and 
provides an overview of relevant empirical findings on the role of working memory 
in dealing with negative emotions. The theoretical relations between these 
concepts are organized by a working memory model of distraction from negative 
emotion (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). The central idea of the model is that 
distraction involves the use of limited processing capacity in working memory. 
The more working memory is being used by a distracting activity, the less room 
will remain for negative emotions to persist. The remainder of Chapter 1 
considers how the working memory model fits with the empirical literature, 
including the research that is presented in Chapters 2-4. Moreover, the model’s 
limitations and implications are discussed, along with directions for future work.  
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Chapter 2 describes three experiments that examined whether and how 
loading working memory can attenuate negative mood. Participants were 
exposed to neutral, weakly negative or strongly negative pictures followed by a 
task and a mood scale. Working memory demands were varied by manipulating 
task presence (Study 1), complexity (Study 2), and predictability (Study 3). 
Participants in all three experiments reported less negative moods in negative 
trials with high compared to low working memory demand. Working memory 
demands did not affect mood in the neutral trials. When working memory 
demands were high, participants no longer reported more negative moods in 
response to strongly negative pictures than to weakly negative pictures. These 
findings suggest that loading working memory prevents mood-congruent 
processing, and thereby promotes distraction from negative moods. 
Chapter 3 describes an experimental study which examined whether 
loading working memory not only modulates subjective experience of negative 
emotion, but also the unfolding of emotional brain responses. Using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), task load was found to result in increased 
activation in working memory regions (right dorsolateral frontal cortex, right 
superior parietal cortex), but in decreased responsivity to negative scenes in 
emotional regions (the bilateral amygdalae and the right inferior insula). In line 
with previous research, task load also reduced subjectively experienced negative 
emotion in response to negative scenes. Together, these findings support a 
model in which emotional and non-emotional information compete for the limited 
capacity of working memory. 
Chapter 4 reports two experiments that examined the effect of working 
memory load on unintentional intrusions of negative information on attentional 
processing. Whereas attentional interference of negative information has been 
assumed to be automatic and unavoidable (Pratto & John, 1991), Chapter 4 
advances the hypothesis that this effect may depend on the availability of working 
memory resources. In two experiments, participants judged the gender of angry 
versus happy faces. Working memory load was manipulated by the presence or 
absence of a math task (Study 1) or mental rehearsal of a one- versus eight-digit 
number (Study 2). The results showed that angry faces interfered more with 
gender naming than happy faces, but only when working memory load was low. 
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These results indicate that attentional interference of negative information can be 
modulated by top-down attentional control processes.  
Taken together, the present dissertation suggests that working memory 
plays a vital role in dealing with negative emotion. Indeed, taxing working 
memory was found to moderate the impact of negative emotional stimuli on 
negative feelings (Chapter 2 and 3), circuits within the emotional brain (Chapter 
3) and attentional interference of negative information (Chapter 4). As such, the 
present dissertation demonstrates how, despite the pervasive impact of negative 
emotional information, people may be capable of regulating negative emotional 
responses in accord with ongoing task demands and goal-directed activities. 
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meer. Dus bedankt Anna, Annemarie, Camiel, Daniel, Daniël, Francesca, 
Frederike, Guido, Jan-Willem, Karen, Karin, Kaska, Lasana, Leila, Loran, Luuk, 
Marijke, Marina, Margreet, Martijn, Matthijs, Myrke, Nickie, Niek, Nils, Nina, 
Petra, Remco, Sjoerd, Wilco en alle anderen.  
 
In het bijzonder wil ik Monique bedanken, voor het bijstaan tijdens de 
heetste uurtjes van de strijd, en Daphne, omdat we al zo lang samen hetzelfde 
pad bewandelen, als collega’s, maar vooral als vriendinnetjes. 
 
Bedankt ook aan alle collega’s, in binnen –en buitenland, met wie ik van 
gedachten heb kunnen wisselen tijdens Brown Bag Lunches, colloquia, KLI-
workshops, de EAESP Summerschool in Padova, het ASPO congres, en andere 
wetenschappelijke gemeenplaatsen. Deze (in)formele interacties hebben mijn 
plezier in de wetenschap enorm geprikkeld. Hierbij wil ik met name Anouk van 
het KLI bedanken voor haar hulp, en voor het geduld met alle logistieke 
aanpassingen waarmee ik haar in de loop der jaren heb lastig gevallen. 
 
Dan blijven er nog twee collega’s over die een speciaal woord van dank 
verdienen. Het zijn de twee vrouwen die mijn werkende bestaan op de VU zo 
aangenaam hebben gemaakt. Lieve Carla en Clare, heel hartelijk bedankt voor al 
jullie lieve zorgen en jullie warme aanwezigheid. Ik ga jullie heel erg missen! 
(Doe ik nu al). 
 
Gelukkig heb ik ook nog een leven buiten de wetenschap. En hierin 
vervullen heel veel lieve mensen een belangrijke rol. Mijn Amsterdamse 
vriendinnetjes: Lous, Marijtje, Jelle en Nellie. Toi natuurlijk. Al mijn Amsterdamse 
kroegmaatjes: Cindy, Ernie, Hans, Jeroen, Lexie, Maja, Marsel en Gekke 
Marieke. Mijn Utrechtse gabbers: Letje en Freek. Mijn lieve Arnhemse 
schoolvriendinnetjes: Krisje, Ghi en Jon. Bedankt allemaal, dat jullie er zijn! En in 
het bijzonder Chris: bedankt voor wat je in mijn leven betekend hebt, en nog 
steeds betekent. Het ga je goed Down Under. 
 
Tot slot, maar boven alles, wil ik mijn lieve familie bedanken. Mijn zusje 
Pien en mijn lieve papa Ben en mama Lucie. Bedankt dat jullie er zijn, en dat 
jullie van me houden. Ik hou ook van jullie! 
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